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ABSTRACT
The present investigation sought to determine whether the opponent process 
theory of acquired motivation (Soloman and Corbit, 1974; Soloman, 1980) could 
provide a theoretical account for the maintenance of intrusive thoughts and 
obsessions. Ten subjects experiencing negative intrusive thoughts of a high 
frequency, participated in an habituation training procedure which involved 
exposure to their thoughts over several t r ia ls .  I t  was predicted that the 
intensity of negative affect would decrease with ongoing exposure. In 
accordance with opponent process theory, i t  was further predicted that a mood 
change in the opposite direction would occur upon termination of these 
thoughts.
Using subjective mood scales i t  was demonstrated that the engaging of negative 
intrusive thoughts successfully induced negative affect. However, there was 
no evidence to support the presence of affective habituation or contrast 
phenomena. These findings were consistent with earl ier results observed by 
Ward (1988). I t  was suggested that further c lar i f ica t ion of the opponent 
process theory is required before a def in i t ive application to intrusive 
thoughts may be attempted.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 OVERVIEW
The present study addresses an unusual proposition; can we become addicted to 
our own thoughts? Intrusive thoughts, clinical obsessions and compulsions are 
recurrent and compelling phenomena sharing drive features similar to other 
addictive and impulsive behaviours. Yet intrusive thoughts and obsessions are 
not regarded as 'addictive' because they provide no apparent source of
pleasure which we would normally associate with the maintenance of such
behaviours (Ward, 1988).
Intrusive thoughts are repetitive, involuntary cognitions that occur in the 
form of thoughts, images or impulses and may be either pleasant or
unpleasant. They include intrusive mental activities such as perpetual day 
dreaming and persistent worries (Rachman, 1981). They are regarded as
obsessions if they are experienced as egodystonic, occur at a high frequency, 
are significantly distressing and disrupt normal social functioning. They are 
frequently associated with compulsive behaviours, which are performed to
reduce discomfort arising from the obsession and are negatively reinforced as 
a coping strategy (DSM-lll-R, 1987).
Impulsive behaviours such as excessive drinking or gambling have come to be 
regarded as addictions because they share features characteristic of drug
abuse models of addiction (e.g. Kagen and Squires, 1985). Defining
characteristics include an inability to stop the behaviour, to engage in
increasing levels of the activity, the development of psychological symptoms 
if use is prevented and impaired social or occupational performance 
(DSM-lll-R, 1987). Obsessions and compulsions share these features and yet a 
clear theoretical distinction exists between this disorder and other
'addictive' behaviours. Thus, while gambling or drug taking provide pleasure 
and are egosyntonic, obsessions and compulsions are typically regarded as 
senseless and, apart from tension reduction, provide no identifiable source of 
pleasure. To establish such an affective basis within obsessional 
symptomology would question this distinction and have considerable theoretical 
implications.
Current methodologies examining the nature of obsessions have accepted the 
negative maintenance view of the disorder and considered only negative 
emotions associated with them. Numerous studies have observed anxiety and 
tension reduction in association with obsessions and compulsions (e.g. Rachman 
and Hodgeson, 1980; Emmelkamp, 1982 and Foa and Steketee, 1985) and a similar 
affective status associated with negative intrusive thoughts (Rachman and 
Hodgeson, 1980). Yet the pervasive failure to examine potential sources of 
positive emotion means that the affect-based distinction between addictive 
behaviours and obsessions is based on an assumption that has not been 
empirically validated.
Recent studies by Edwards and Dickerson (1987b) and Legg-England and Dickerson 
(1988) have questioned this assumption. They found that pleasant intrusive 
thoughts were similar to unpleasant intrusive thoughts in that they increased 
arousal, were emotionally intense and equally hard to control. Significantly, 
subjects reported that they 'enjoyed' the former category of thought. 
Unfortunately full scale measures of both positive and negative emotion were 
not used and so an accurate range of data on the affect induced by intrusive 
thoughts was not attained. In order to make a valid affect-based distinction 
between addictive behaviours and intrusive thought phenomena, future research 
into the latter will need to consider a full range of emotional responses.
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The aim of this study was to consider both positive and negative emotions 
associated with intrusive thoughts. I f  i t  can be shown that positive as well 
as negative emotions are associated with negative intrusive thoughts then 
their maintenance and treatment could be studied from an 'addictions' 
perspective. While Edwards et. a l . (1987b) were able to establish that
intrusive thoughts can e l i c i t  positive emotions, a specific theoretical 
account of how positive affect could be derived from negative intrusive 
thoughts is s t i l l  needed. Soloman's (1980) 'opponent-process theory' provides 
such an explanation. I t  postulates that negative affective states are capable 
of inducing positive affective secondary responses as a form of homeostasis. 
This may lead to the maintenance of an aversive in i t ia t ing  behaviour via a 
posit ively reinforcing postreaction, as might be seen in act iv i t ies such as 
sky-diving (Epstein, 1967, cited in Soloman, 1980) or blood donation 
(Pil iavin,  Callero and Evans, 1 982)..
The present study follows an earl ier attempt by Ward (1988) to establish a 
possible source of positive affect as a factor maintaining intrusive thoughts 
and incorporates a number of methodological refinements based on the results 
of that study. As with the earl ier attempt, the present thesis proposes that 
opponent-process theory is consistent with current theoretical accounts of 
intrusive thought phenomena, as well as existing empirical evidence. Although 
the relevant l i terature indicates the possible existence of an opponent 
process associated with intrusive thoughts, conclusive evidence is s t i l l  
lacking. The current research design is presented as a further test of the 
proposition that negative intrusive thoughts are maintained by an affective 
opponent process.
1 .2  THE OPPONENT PROCESS THEORY OF ACQUIRED MOTIVATION
In his opponent process theory, Soloman (1980) postulates that emotional or 
hedonic processes are involved in every case of acquired motivation. Three
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affective phenomena are assumed to be operative within this system; (1) 
affective contrast, (2) affective habitation (tolerance) and (3) affective 
withdrawal (abstinence syndrome). Soloman points to heroin addiction as one 
of the most obvious examples of this dynamic. Initial  doses of an opiate 
produce a highly pleasant sensation called a ' rush' .  With the metabolic
destruction of the drug the user then experiences a secondary aversive state 
characterised by mild physiological and psychological discomfort. Affective 
contrast such as this may also be observed where the init ial  stimulus has been 
unpleasant. Epstein (1967) reported the dramatic example of military
parachutists who showed extreme fear responses during their f i r s t  few jumps 
but became elated with their completion.
With the repeated presentation of affective stimuli subjects rapidly habituate 
demonstrating decreased responding to such stimulation. With opiate use this 
is ini t ial ly realised as a lessening of the euphoric state following the 
initial  rush experience. After a number of doses in succession addicts
typically do not experience this euphoria. Affective habituation has then
occurred with the decline of the init ial  hedonic state.
The withdrawal syndrome is the third affective phenomena considered by the 
opponent process theory and considers the accentuation of the secondary
affective state which occurs in conjunction with the habituation process. For 
the heroin addict abstinence after routine dosing produces extreme
physiological and psychological discomfort which includes nausea, muscular 
aches and cravings for the drug. From an ini t ial ly pleasant state,  withdrawal 
is experienced as highly aversive. Thus a shift in reinforcement
contingencies usually emerges from the (reduced) positive reinforcement of the 
initial  affective response towards avoidance of withdrawal symptoms, which 
negatively reinforces ongoing use.
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Affective withdrawal also develops in behaviours where the init ial  experience 
is unpleasant. In such cases subjects may experience a small amount of rel ief 
after the unpleasant activity but are unlikely to continue in the absence of 
extraneous pressures to do so. This may typically occur when social pressures 
or personal beliefs lead to repetition of the activity (e.g. drug use, blood 
donation; Soloman, 1980; Piliavin, et. al . 1 982). With ongoing repetition 
there will again be a shift in reinforcement contingencies with a decline in 
aversiveness and the emergence of a withdrawal syndrome with a positive 
valence. Experienced parachutists for example, no longer report intense fear 
but a level of tension and a ' t h r i l l '  during the free-fall  followed by intense 
social interaction and euphoria after a safe landing. The standard pattern of 
affective dynamics is presented in Figure 1.1.
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The standard pattern of affective dynamics (from Soloman, 
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Figure 1.1:
Soloman and Corbit  (1973, 1974) devised a simple theore tical model to account 
for  the a f fec t ive  dynamics observed in the examples above. This a f fec t  
control system has a single negative feedback loop and assumes an operation 
simi lar to other homeostatic mechanisms such that the brains of mammals 
function to oppose extreme or prolonged emotional arousal. To th is  extent the 
a b i l i t y  to maintain a f fec t ive  s t a b i l i t y  is presumed to have an adaptive 
function. The theory suggests that a primary a f fec t ive  response, called an 
'a' process, is e l i c i t e d  by any Pavlovian UCS, operant re in forcer  or innate 
releaser. The a process is a stable, unconditional reaction which correlates 
with the in tens i ty ,  qua l i ty  and duration of the s t im u l i .  The a process in 
turn arouses an opposing ' b ' process which is hypothesised to be of sluggish 
latency, slow to reach i t s  peak and slow to decay a f te r  the o r ig ina l  sensory 
input has been terminated and the a process has stopped. Since the b process 
acts to oppose the a process, growth in strength by the former is associated 
with a weakening of the la t t e r .
According to the model, the manifest emotional state of the subject may be 
computed as the absolute dif ference between the two underlying processes. I f  
a > b then the subject is said to be experiencing an emotional state, known as 
State A; and i f  b > a then the subject is in State B. Each of these manifest 
states w i l l  be s im i la r  in qua l i ty  to the i r  underlying processes but w i l l  not 
necessari ly be of the same magnitude. With the onset of the st imuli  there 
w i l l  be a peak in emotional State A which rapid ly  subsides as the b process is 
i n i t i a te d .  With the o f fse t  of the s t im u l i ,  the a process is terminated and 
the true qua l i ty  o f  the b process may be observed with the manifest B state 
being to t a l l y  due to the opponent process from th is  point.
Soloman (1980) has fu r ther  postulated that s ign i f ica n t  changes to the opponent 
process occur as a resu l t  of  repeated exposure to the stimulus. S pec i f ica l ly ,
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while the a process is unaffected by repeated exposure, i t  is assumed that the 
b process is strengthened by use and weakened disuse. I t  is as a d irect  
resul t  of th is  strengthening of the b process that a f fec t ive  habituation and 
withdrawal occur; the former, specif ic  to State A, occuring when the magnitude 
and in tens i ty  of the a process are reduced by the accentuating b process, 
which functions to drag i t  down. Thus i f  State A o r ig in a l l y  had a posi t ive 
hedonic tone, i t  w i l l  become less pleasant with repeated exposure. The 
strengthening of the b process also produces the a f fec t ive  withdrawal syndrome 
as the manifest B State grows in both in tens i ty  and duration. With repeated 
presentations therefore, a B State experienced as pleasurable would become 
more so, whi ls t  an aversive postreaction would s im i la r ly  accentuate. Figure 
1-2 shows a comparison of  the ef fects on the b process of the presentation of 
both fam i l ia r  and r e la t i v e l y  novel s t im u l i .
Panel A. Panel B.
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Figure 1.2: Effects on the b process of novel and fam iliar stimuli (from
Soloman, 1980, p700.)
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An important q u a l i f i c a t io n  to the effects of repeated exposure on the
accentuation of the opponent process, is Soloman's suggestion that the 
in te rvals  between successive exposures must be shorter than the time normally 
required to al low the b process to decay to i t s  baseline value. Thus the b 
process w i l l  only accentuate i f  presentations occur wi thin a certain
inte r-s t imulus in te rva l .  An in te rm i t ten t  drug user fo r  example w i l l
experience a f u l l  rush and minimal withdrawal. On the other hand, an habitual
user, who doses with in the withdrawal phase (b process) to avoid i ts  aversive
a f fec ts ,  w i l l  experience no 'high' and a subsequent accentuation of 
withdrawal, prolonging the cycle of  maintenance.
Starr (1978) has provided empirical evidence fo r  th is  phenomena showing that 
distress ca l l ing  in duckl ings (aversive B state) was only accentuated by one 
minute separations from th e i r  mother while longer durations outside th is  
c r i t i c a l  decay duration produced no changes in responding. He fu r the r  
observed that an enhancement of  the qua l i ty  of the st imulat ion could produce 
an increase in the c r i t i c a l  decay duration of the b process. S im i la r ly ,  he 
noted that responding did not revert to baseline levels fo l lowing a period of  
non-exposure but showed a more rapid return to previous levels of response 
in tens i ty  upon re-exposure. Starr referred to th is  la tent maintenance of  
response function as the 'savings p r in c ip le ' .  Soloman (1980) suggested a 
general pr inc ip le  fo r  opponent processes based on these f ind ings,  suggesting 
that they are strengthened by use and approach asymptotes having values that 
are a d i rec t  function of  the qu a l i ty ,  in tens i ty ,  and duration of each exposure 
and an inverse function of the interst imulus in te rva l .  They are also subject 
to more rapid accentuation fo l lowing re-exposure where there has been a 
previous h is tory  of responding.
Since i t s  f i r s t  presentat ion (Soloman and Corbit ,  1973) and subsequent
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elaboration (Soloman, 1980) opponent-process theory has been applied to a
var ie ty  of human behaviours to explain the motivation fo r  such diverse
a c t i v i t i e s  as c igarette smoking (Soloman and Corbit ,  1973), job sa t is fac t ion  
(Landy, 1978), alcohol use (Shipley, 1982) and exercise dependence (Thompson 
and Blanton, 1987). Recent studies supporting the predict ions of the
opponent-process theory have t y p ic a l ly  used subjective rat ings to assess mood 
status, the dependent var iable;  as in the assessment of examination stress
(Craig and Siegal, 1 979), blood donation (P i l ia v in ,  et.  al . 1 982), breast
feeding (Myers and Siegal, 1985) and food tastes (Rozin and Vollmecke, 1986). 
However, performance measures such as speech rate (Wil l iams, 1980) and naming 
latencies (Tyson and Flemming, 1987), and physiological measures of  skin 
conductance (Yelan, 1985) and sa l ivat ion response (Rozin, Reff, Mark and 
Schul 1 , 1984) have also been used successful ly as indices of the dependent 
va r iab le .
1 .3  THEORETICAL MODELS OF OBSESSIONS, COMPULSIONS AND INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS
The central hypothesis of the current thesis considers the p o s s ib i l i t y  that 
obsessive-compulsive thoughts and behaviour are maintained via an a f fec t ive  
opponent process. Given i t s  focus on the a f fec t ive  dynamics associated with 
negative in trus ive thoughts i t  is necessary to examine current theore tica l  
models of obsessions and in trus ive thoughts and consider the re la t ionsh ip  
between them.
Psychodynamic formulations of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) were f i r s t  
to emerge (e.g. Freud, 1896) but have general ly fa i le d  to f ind  empirical 
support and have ty p ic a l ly  yielded poor treatment outcomes (Cawley, 1974). 
Behavioural ly oriented approaches have enjoyed far  greater success both 
empir ica l ly  and as an applied treatment methodology (Foa, Steketee, Grayson 
and Doppelt, 1983). These have the i r  genesis in the work of Mowrer (1960) who
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proposed a two-stage theory of acquis i t ion and maintenance of  OCD. In the 
f i r s t  stage obsessions are c la ss ica l ly  conditioned when a neutral event 
becomes associated with fear by being paired with st imuli  which evoke 
discomfort or anxiety. Through an associat ive process, concrete objects,  
thoughts and images a l l  acquire the a b i l i t y  to produce discomfort. In the 
second stage, avoidance responses develop, including compulsive r i t u a ls  and 
escape behaviours, which reduce discomfort and are thereby negatively 
reinforced, leading to th e i r  maintenance as a coping strategy. These 
strategies are only e f fec t ive  in the short term however, preventing longer 
term exposure which would lead to habituation and th e i r  eventual ex t inc t ion .
Despite some c r i t i c ism  of the fear acquis i t ion phase of  th is  process (e.g. 
Gray, 1975; Rachman and Wilson, 1980) recent theories have maintained the 
essential elements of  the two-stage model, pertain ing to onset and 
maintenance, while expanding upon the conditions pert inent  to these phenomena 
(e.g. Rachman and Hodgeson, 1980; Salkovskis, 1985). Rachman has extended the 
model beyond the c l in ic a l  populat ion, point ing to major s im i la r i t i e s  between 
normal intrus ive thoughts and c l in i c a l  ruminations. Evidence from several 
studies has shown that unwanted in t rus ive  thoughts are a common experience and 
occur in 80-97% of the normal population, (e.g. Rachman and De S i lva, 1978; 
Parkinson and Rachman, 1981; Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984; Legg England and 
Dickerson, 1988).
Rachman and De Si lva (1978) establ ished that ' in t ru s ive  unacceptable thoughts' 
experienced by normal subjects were s im i lar  to c l in i c a l  obsessions in th e i r  
form, content, meaningfulness and re la t ionship  to t r igger ing  s t im u l i .  They 
note that experienced c l in ic ia n s  were unable to d is t igu ish  them on these 
indices alone. C l in ica l  obsessions do, however d i f f e r  in th e i r  frequency, 
duration and in tens i ty .  They also cause more d is t ress,  are harder to dismiss, 
are less acceptable, more unpleasant and provoke more urges to neutra l ise.
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These results  ind icate, essen t ia l ly ,  that normal and abnormal thought 
phenomena such as these do not d i f f e r  q u a l i ta t i v e ly  in terms of the form or 
content of the experience, but do so quan t i ta t ive ly  in terms of  the factors 
re la t ing  to the emotional response they e l i c i t  ( i . e .  in tens i ty  and subsequent 
durat ion and frequency). Thus, Rachman and De Si lva (1978) deduced that 
in t rus ive  thought phenomena occur on a continuum, with c l in i c a l  obsessions 
being a more severe manifestation of thoughts experienced by the normal 
population. Salkovskis (1985, 1989a) has suggested that i t  is differences in 
cognit ive appraisal of the content o f  the thought which lead to quant i ta t ive 
dif ferences in the emotional response to these s t im u l i .
Rachman and De Si lva (1978) in establ ishing a theoretical  re la t ionsh ip  between 
c l in i c a l  obsessions and unwanted in t rus ive thoughts, have s ig n i f i c a n t l y  
expanded the population avai lable fo r  study. In ou t l in ing  his model of OCD 
(Rachman and Hodgeson, 1980), Rachman has fu r the r  elucidated th is  
re la t ionsh ip ,  ou t l in ing  the conditions under which normal in t rus ive  thought 
phenomena may take on c l in i c a l  s ign if icance. Based on the three systems 
analysis of Lang, obsessions are conceived of having cognit ive, behavioural 
and psychophysiological components (Lang, Malamed and Hart, 1970). The 
cognit ive component has two facets, 1) the subjects perceived loss of control 
and 2) subjective reports of d is t ress.  The behavioural component includes 
overt compulsive r i t u a ls  and avoidance behaviours which reduce discomfort and 
are negatively re inforced. The psychophysiological component considers 
typ ica l  f i g h t  or f l i g h t  responses and is derived from emotion and fear 
theories (e.g. Lang, 1979).
Rachman argues that whi le most people pe r iod ica l ly  experience unwanted 
in t rus ive  thoughts, in the absence of  lowered a f fec t  and cer tain predisposing 
fac to rs ,  such thoughts produce l i t t l e  emotional disturbance and are readi ly
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assimilated. However during or a f te r  periods of dysphoria and/or exposure to 
stress, these thoughts or urges may become frequent, in trus ive and 
discomfort ing. During times of heightened arousal they take on the propert ies 
of noxious st imuli  causing dis tress. In th is  sense they come to resemble 
phobic s t im u l i ,  provoking avoidance behaviour and a fa i lu re  to habituate 
leading to the i r  maintenance.
A number of  predisposing factors have been described by Rachman, the presence 
of  which may exacerbate c l in i c a l  obsessions or resu l t  in in t rus ive thoughts 
taking on a c l in ic a l  status where th is  was not previously the case. These 
include 1) dysphoric mood state, 2) exposure to stress, 3) personal ly 
id iosyncra t ic  perceptions of  'unacceptab i l i ty '  ( i . e .  high standards of conduct 
or mora l i ty ) ,  4) s e n s i t i v i t y  to danger signals and 5) personal i ty factors.  
Thus a tendency to neuroticism and a predisposit ion toward the attainment of a 
high standard of conduct is l i k e l y  to produce unwanted in t rus ive thoughts at 
times of high stress and/or dysphoric mood. Obsessions are thereafter 
maintained by a cycle of events whereby in trus ive thoughts produce 
psychological and somatic disturbance as well as a perceived loss of contro l .  
This generates fu r the r  dysphoria, producing greater su sce p t ib i l i t y  to the 
in t rus ive thought and the subsequent repet i t ion  of the cycle (Rachman and 
Hodgeson, 1980.)
A central tenet of Rachman's model is that i t  is the unpleasantness of the 
thought which p r im ar i ly  determines the persons a b i l i t y  to control i t .  Studies 
by Salkovskis and Harrison (1984) and Clarke (1986a) have supported such a 
re la t ionsh ip ,  although Parkinson and Rachman (1981) observed a fac to r ia l  
separation between unpleasantness and c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y ,  questioning i t s  
v a l i d i t y .  Other f ind ings have indicated that i t  is not the inherent 
'unpleasantness' of the thought, per se, which determines c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  but
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i ts emotional intensity. Thus Clarke and De Silva (1985) argue that unwanted 
intrusive thoughts are events that are of a primarily anxious nature and 
observed that emotional intensity and contro l lab i l i ty  were the most salient 
defining features of intrusive thoughts. Recent findings by Edwards and 
Dickerson (1987b) and Legg-England and Dickerson (1988), that pleasant 
intrusive thoughts associated with high levels of arousal are as d i f f i c u l t  to 
control as unpleasant intrusions, adds further weight to this theory 
suggesting that emotional intensity of a positive valence, similarly leads to 
impaired control.
Salkovskis (1985, 1989a) has outlined a cognitive behavioural model of
obsessions which expands upon the basic structure of the behavioural
paradigm. Like Rachman, he assumes that most people experience intrusive
thoughts, but emphasises the role of cognitions in determining which thoughts 
wi l l  persist. He argues that negative affect temporally associated with an 
intrusive thought is not the result of the thought i t se l f  but of negative 
automatic thoughts (Salkovskis, 1985), or the system of appraisal (Salkovskis, 
1989b) by which the intrusive thought is evaluated. More specif ically he 
suggests that this appraisal centres on cognitive beliefs in responsibil i ty
for the prevention of harm, which produce distress and lead to compulsive
r i tua ls.  Such responses relieve distress associated with feelings of 
responsibili ty but reinforce the belief that responsiblity was actually
involved. This leads to the maintenance of both the thought and compulsion 
which come to be regarded as valid. Fig 1.3 shows the cognitive behavioural
model of the development of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
13  -
Figure 1.3:
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Within the model Salkovskis emphasises the crucial role played by neutralising 
behaviours and especially neutralising thoughts. The presence of such
thoughts, regarded as func t ion a l ly  equivalent to overt compulsive r i t u a ls ,  has 
been recognised fo r  some time. They have been variously described as 
'anxiety-reducing obsessions', 'covert compulsions' (Wolpe, 1958) 'cognit ive 
r i t u a l s '  (Robertson, Wiggenson and Kaplan, 1983) and as a form of cognitive 
'ne u t ra l is in g '  (Salkovskis, 1985). Yet despite the i r  long-term recognit ion as 
a c l in i c a l  e n t i t y  and the success of behavioural interventions with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, such treatment has yielded conspicuously poor 
outcomes in the treatment of pure obsessional ruminations. Salkovskis argues 
that in such cases behavioural methodologies such as exposure and response 
prevention have been inappropr ia te ly  applied and that exposure to the thought 
and cognit ive response prevention applied to cognit ive r i tu a ls  is necessary to 
achieve habituation and a lowering of  frequency. Supporting evidence for  the 
function of cognit ive r i t u a ls  has come from a treatment study by Kirk (1983) 
who demonstrated that the appl icat ion of thought stopping to neutra l is ing 
cognitions (rather than the obsessions) resulted in rapid habituation and 
successful treatment outcomes.
1 .4  INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS AND OPPONENT PROCESS THEORY
In t rus ive thoughts are, by d e f in i t i o n ,  associated with mood states of  a 
non-neutral valence. Rachman (1981) defines in trus ive thoughts as:
" re p e t i t ive  thoughts, impulses or images that are unacceptable and 
unwanted. . .  land which] in te r rup t  ongoing a c t i v i t y ,  are at t ibuted to an 
internal o r ig in  and are d i f f i c u l t  to con tro l . "  p.91.
Thus, in t rus ive  thoughts are d i f fe ren t ia ted  from spontaneous cognitions 
related to routine a c t i v i t i e s  by v i r tue  of the i r  recurrence, non-vo l i t ional  
qua l i ty  and associated hedonic tone. Their content is t y p ic a l ly  evaluated as 
pleasant or unpleasant, wh i ls t  features of the i r  presentat ion, namely a lack
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of p r e d ic ta b i l i t y  and control ,  often provide a fu r ther  source of d is tress. 
Edwards and Dickerson (1987b) have provided fur ther  evidence suggesting that 
in t rus ive thoughts are capable of inducing both posit ive and negative 
a f fec t ive  states. Evidence of primary a f fec t ive  responses concomitant with 
in t rus ive thoughts provides a necessary pre-condition fo r  the test ing of 
Solomon's theory. The acquis it ion of a new motivational source, of the type 
postulated for  in t rus ive thought phenomena, is derived from an a f fec t ive  
dynamic ( i . e .  habituation, contrast and withdrawal processes) which is 
u l t ima te ly  dependent on an i n i t i a l  mood induction, the a process.
1 . 4 . 1 .  HABITUATION TO INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS
Habituation t ra in ing  procedures have had an obvious c l in ic a l  appl icat ion in 
the treatment of obsessions. These methods, var iously label led ' s a t ia t io n '  
(Rachman, 1971) 'paradoxical in tent ion ' (Solyom, 1972) and 'exposure' 
(Emmelkamp and Giesselbach, 1981) have in common the attempt to decrease 
discomfort associated with obsessions by al lowing progressive adaptation, via 
exposure, to the potent emotional elements of these s t im u l i .  With various 
modif icat ions they have proven successful in reducing anxiety over repeated 
presentations and also decreasing the frequency of obsessional ruminations 
(e.g. Foa and Steketee, 1 979; Moregan, Maier, Brown and Pollard, 1 987 and 
Salkovskis and Westbrook, 1989).
Consistent with the resul ts  of c l in ic a l  t r i a l s ,  Parkinson and Rachman (1980) 
observed s ign i f ica n t  decrements in responding fo l lowing the appl icat ion of 
habituation t ra in ing  to in t rus ive thoughts experienced by non-c l in ica l  
subjects. In addit ion to decreases in subjective rat ings of discomfort across 
t r i a l s ,  they also observed that the latency ( i . e .  re t r ieva l  times) of 
in t rus ive thoughts increased. Other indices such as in tens i ty ,  stressful ness, 
unacceptabi l i ty , u n c o n t ro l la b i l i t y  and anxiety also decreased. This e f fec t
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was augmented by the p r io r  use of  re laxat ion t ra in ing  which appeared to 
f a c i l i t a t e  exposure. These resul ts  are s im i lar  to those of Sutherland, Newman 
and Rachman (1982) who observed that repeated exposure to in t rus ive thoughts 
led to an increase in dismissal times during a sad mood condit ion.
The time taken to re tr ieve and dismiss an in t rus ive  thought are important in 
that they appear to provide an index of habituation beyond subjective or 
physiological measures. This relates to the re la t ionship  between emotional 
in tens i ty  and c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  previously discussed. Edwards and Dickerson 
(1987a) observed s imi lar  resul ts  to those of the habituation studies when they 
observed that the time required to dismiss negative in t rus ive  thoughts was 
longer than fo r  neutral thoughts. They also found that posi t ive and negative 
in trusive thoughts were equal ly uncontrol lable (Edwards and Dickerson, 
1987b). In explaining the i r  results they drew upon information processing 
theories re la t ing  to at tentional resources (e.g.Navon and Gopher, 1979 and 
Salame and Badderly, 1982). They suggested that in t rus ive  thoughts, by v i r tue  
of the i r  complexity and high emotional in te ns i ty ,  are automatical ly given 
processing p r io r i t y .  This resu lts in an impoverished (p a ra l le l )  capacity to 
conduct other processes which might be directed at disattending the primary 
intrus ive s t im u l i .
The account provided by Edwards and Dickerson provides a theoretica l  
explanation fo r  the 1 uncontrol 1ab i1i t y 1 observed in associat ion with 
emotionally intense in t rus ive cognitions. In th is  sense also the e f fec t  of 
habituation may be seen as a lowering of a f fec t ive  tone which allows a normal 
information processing capacity ( i . e .  ' c o n t ro l ' )  to be re insta ted. A spira l  
e f fec t  may then ensue whereby an increase in perceived control fu r the r  lowers 
a f fec t ,  increasing subsequent processing resources. I t  also accounts fo r  
improved habituation with p r io r  re laxat ion (Parkinson and Rachman, 1980) and 
greater v u ln e ra b i l i t y  to in t rus ive thoughts during dysphoria (Sutherland,
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Newman and Rachman, 1982). These resul ts  are not consistent with those of 
Clarke (1986b), who found that repeated exposure to negative cognitions did
not s ig n i f i c a n t l y  inf luence re t r ieva l  or dismissal times. In th is  case 
however, the fa i lu re  o f  subjects to use the i r  own thoughts, the small t r i a l  
numbers and short exposure durat ions, were not l i k e l y  to have produced 
habituation in accordance with the paradigm (Rachman, 1976).
1 . 4 . 2  AFFECTIVE CONTRAST & WITHDRAWAL
In contrast to the avai lable evidence on habituation to c l in i c a l  and 
non-c l in ica l  in t rus ive cognit ions, there has been v i r t u a l l y  no examination of 
contrast and withdrawal processes in re la t ion  to these phenomena. With the 
exception of one study to be discussed fu r the r  (Ward, 1988), there has been a 
presumption that posi t ive a f fec t  is un l ike ly  to be associated with negative 
cognit ions, such that measures including a posi t ive a f fec t  scale have not been 
used. In addit ion, a f fec t ive  status has t y p ic a l l y  been measured only during
the thought, with the fa i lu re  to consider a f fec t ive  postreactions ensuring 
that an opponent process would not be detected. Despite th is ,  physiological 
measures taken before, during and a f te r  obsessional th inking have shown trends 
consistent with an opponent process. Rabavilas and Boulougouris (1974) and
Grey, Rachman and Sartory (1981) have observed increases in heart rate during 
obsessional ruminations which have fa l le n  below baseline upon termination of 
these thoughts. While sign if icance tests were not reported, and a d i rec t
coincidence should not be assumed (e.g. Lang, 1969) these trends in
physiological responding are ind ica t ive of an a f fec t ive  opponent process. A 
report by Rachman and Roper (1976), showing a s im i la r  trend with self - reported 
measures of discomfort in re la t ion  to obsessional th ink ing, fu r the r  supports 
th is .
1 . 4 . 3 .  EVIDENCE FROM MOOD INDUCTION PROCEDURES
The previous section pointed to a lack of  d i rec t  evidence fo r  contrast and
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withdrawal processes in re la t ion  to intrus ive thoughts. Furthermore, studies 
report ing such processes have ty p ic a l ly  considered primary a f fec t ive  sources 
derived from external st imuli  such as drugs and food. In t rus ive thoughts by 
contrast may be regarded as internal s t im u l i ,  producing an emotional response 
more d i re c t l y  mediated by cognitions. Emotional responses derived in th is  
way, as in studies of job sa t is fac t ion  or test anxiety, have been shown to 
fo l low an opponent process. Evidence from mood induction experiments is of 
pa r t icu la r  relevance however in that they o f fe r  a close analogue to processes 
observed in in t rus ive  thoughts. Spec i f ica l ly ,  they produce a primary 
a f fec t ive  state s im i la r  to that of instrusive thoughts (Teasdale et. a l ., 
1980; Clark and De Si lva, 1985) are pr imar i ly  derived from cognit ive st imuli  
(e.g. Sutherland, Newman and Rachman, 1982) and have shown some speci f ic  
evidence of  an opponent process.
Williams (1980) used a mood induction procedure devised by Thompson et. al . 
(1979) to determine the e f fec t  of  depressed mood on speech rate. He observed 
that the time taken to count to ten was s ig n i f ic a n t ly  fas ter  fo l lowing the 
completion of a performance task, than immediately a f te r  mood induction or at 
baseline p r io r  to the procedure. Williams regarded th is  'rebound e f f e c t 1 on 
speech rate fo l lowing mood induction as evidence consistent with other 
opponent process phenomena observed in animals and humans.
Ranieri and Zeiss (1981, ci ted in Ranieri and Zeiss, 1984) conducted an 
exploratory study considering why people w i l l i n g l y  engage in a c t i v i t i e s  that 
make them feel sad. They found that subjects rated events occuring 
immediately a f te r  a 'sadness-inducing a c t i v i t y '  as sub ject ively  more pleasant 
than events p r io r  to th is  a c t i v i t y .  They argued that the opponent-process 
theory offered the best explanation fo r  th is  f ind ing.  In a fu r the r  experiment 
(Ranieri and Zeiss, 1984) using the Velten (1968) mood induction procedure, no
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evidence was found fo r  an opponent process, although i t  may be argued that a 
design flaw in the spacing of assessment in terva ls  produced the nul l  re su l t .  
As in the Williams study, the greatest rate of mood change was observed at 2.5 
minutes fo l lowing mood induction, at which point Williams observed a peak 
decline below baseline. However since the mood induction durat ion in the 
Ranieri study was 20 minutes, twice that o f  the Williams induction, i t  is 
probable that the peak of  the b process would have been around the 5 minute 
mark. In f a i l i n g  to measure mood un t i l  12.5 minutes post-st imulus, i t  is 
conceivable that the B State peaked and decayed wi th in th is  time, appearing at 
baseline when next measured.
The methodological issues considered in the Ranieri study point to the 
necessity of sensit ive assessment in tervals  given the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  predict ing 
a time course fo r  the B State. Whilst habituation studies would predic t an 
accentuated B State due to mult ip le presentat ions, mood induction procedures 
are only l i k e l y  to achieve a small opponent process. In th is  respect an 
i n i t i a l  presentation is l i k e l y  to produce a B State that w i l l  peak and decay 
within the duration equivalent to that of the i n i t i a l  s t im u l i .  Whilst 
recurring in t rus ive thoughts may be hypothesised to have an accentuated B 
State, as internal st imuli  the course and termination of the a process i t s e l f  
may be d i f f i c u l t  to determine. This fu r the r  necessitates sensi t ive measures 
to determine a subsequent opponent process.
1 .5  THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF COGNITIVE NEUTRALISING
The previous consideration of cognitive neutra l is ing ,  as an a c t i v i t y  requir ing 
c l in ica l  in tervention, also has implicat ions fo r  the opponent-process account 
of the maintenance of in t rus ive thoughts. Salkovskis and Westbrook (1989) 
have re iterated the functional equivalence of cognit ive neutra l is ing with 
behavioural compulsions in that they terminate exposure to in t rus ive
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cognitions, reduce associated negative affect and are negatively reinforced. 
The successful application of response prevention procedures to these 
cognitions (Kirk, 1983; Salkovskis and Westbrook, 1989) has supported the 
theoretical account of their existence and function. Whilst i t  was also 
believed that, as a factor leading to the maintenance of obsessional thinking, 
cognitive neutralisers should be absent from non-clinical populations, recent 
evidence suggests this is not the case. Salkovskis and Dent (1989) report
that in a survey of 243 non-clinical subjects, 111 reported some level of 
covert neutralising behaviour associated with intrusive thoughts, a prevalence 
consistent with that reported in cl inical populations (Rachman and De Silva, 
1978). In addition, subjects who frequently neutralised reported a higher 
degree of discomfort associated with their thoughts. Presumably neutralising 
processes have a strong negative reinforcement value in such cases, are
quickly adopted and paradoxically produce low levels of distress thereafter. 
Indeed Salkovskis and Warwick (1988) have reported cases in which cognitive
neutralising responses became so e f f ic ient  that negative affect was no longer
experienced in association with intrusive thoughts.
The high prevalence of neutralising behaviour in both cl inical and
non-clinical subjects suggests potential ly widespread mediation of primary 
affective responses to intrusive thoughts. This may in turn affect any
opponent process. Several postulates are of relevance to this; (1) the a
process ( i n i t i a l l y )  correlates closely in magnitude to the intensity, quality 
and duration of the provoking stimulus, (2) these primary processes are phasic 
and subject to small stimulus changes, and (3) opponent processes are 
strengthened by use and have asymptotes that are a direct function of the 
quality, intensity and duration of each exposure ( i .e .  the a process). Thus 
the in i t ia l  magnitude of an affective response to an intrusive thought is 
regarded as direct ly proportional to its duration and intensity, with the
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former subject to even small changes in the la t te r .  The opponent process 
s im i la r ly  correlates with the magnitude of the primary a f fec t ive  response and 
is l ikewise subject to changes in these indices.
The previous discussion indicates that where cognit ive neutra l isers  a f fec t  the 
in t rus ive  thought and reduce the emotional response to them, th is  w i l l  
subsequently impact upon the opponent process, reducing or e l iminat ing i t .  
This could occur via a shortening of the duration of the thought or a d i rec t  
reduction of associated a f fec t  via some semantic manifestation such that the 
actual duration of  the thought was no longer related to i t s  a f fec t ive  
potentia l  (Rachman, 1976). The f i r s t  process would reduce the duration of  the 
a process, the second i t s  asymptote. The aforementioned pr inc ip les indicate 
that e i ther outcome would be ref lected in the opponent process, essent ia l ly  
resu l t ing  in i t s  reduction. Over time, neutra l is ing behaviour would lead to 
maintenance, normally sat is fy ing the necessary condition fo r  the accentuation 
of the B State. Yet the recurrent low magnitude of the primary process 
presumably would ensure that i t s  opponent process remained small. This l a t t e r  
point remains speculative as the governing theory is not yet s u f f i c ie n t l y  
detai led to determine whether an a process of  small magnitude which
nonetheless remains constant ( in  f a i l i n g  to habituate) w i l l  produce a greatly  
accentuated B State. As a homeostatic mechanism compensating fo r  a small
i n i t i a l  process, th is  would appear un l ike ly .  For present purposes, there is
s u f f ic ie n t  evidence to suspect that cognitive neutra l is ing exists as a 
potentia l  confound, reducing the hypothesised maintenance role of the opponent 
process. Parkinson and Rachman (1980) indicate the necessity of  screening
subjects fo r  the i r  presence, while Ward's (1988) fa i lu re  to do so may have
been a contr ibuting factor  in her nul l f ind ing fo r  an a f fec t ive  opponent
process.
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1 . 6  THE PRESENT STUDY
The primary objective of the present study was to determine the presence of an 
affective opponent process subsequent to primary mood induction via negative 
intrusive thoughts. I t  is argued that intrusive thoughts are internal stimuli 
capable of inducing mood via cognitive processes. The primary emotional 
response is thought to represent State A. I t  is expected that this w i l l  
e l i c i t  an opponent process with an hedonic tone opposite that of the original 
response. With the termination of the intrusive thought, State B wil l  rise to 
its asymptote and should be observed. The opponent affective state wi l l  then 
return to baseline as long as the thought is not reaccessed. In such an event 
the A State wil l  lower and the B State wil l  accentuate further, being 
accessible to measurement at a later point.
The investigation considered negative intrusive thoughts only. The 
opponent-process theory postulates a trend which is essentially the same 
whether the primary affective response has a positive or negative valency. 
Whilst a specific examination of positive and negative intrusive thoughts via 
the opponent process theory may point to important differences, this is not 
directly germane to the central hypothesis. The study has implications for an 
affect-derived theory of obsessions, that is, negative cognitions maintained 
via a post-reaction hypothesised to be positive. Negative intrusive thoughts 
are therefore the logical choice for a specific examination.
The study by Ward (1988), whilst observing mood induction, fai led to establish 
habituation or affective contrast. Whilst the study appeared well designed to 
e l i c i t  and record the presence of an opponent process, its  fa i lure to do so 
may have been due to several factors. F irst ly ,  the subject population had 
intrusive thoughts of re lat ive ly  low intensity occurring at intervals of up to 
two weeks. In such a group the magnitude of the B State is l ike ly  to have
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been minimal by virtue of their low rate of occurrence or the 'savings' 
principle noted previously (Soloman, 1980). Secondly, i t  may be argued that 
the practice of asking subjects to ' think about their thought' on cue is 
unlikely to produce a valid re-creation of the phenomena in either its usual 
form or intensity. If the stimuli were impoverished in this manner, 
inter-stimulus intervals of one minute may also have been longer than the 
decay duration, leading to a failure of the B State to accentuate. Thirdly, 
the failure to screen subjects for cognitive neutralising responses means that 
if  they did effectively e l ic i t  the thought they may equally have neutralised 
its affective impact in the time alotted, hindering the habituation process
and moderating any resultant B State.
The present study incorporated a number of methodological refinements into the 
basic paradigm to address the above criticisms and maximise the potential 
magnitude of the opponent process:
• Subjects were chosen for the experiment on the basis of earl ier
questionnaire responses and were those who reported a much higher 
frequency of intrusive thoughts occuring at an average rate of up to one
per day. It  was argued that the higher frequency and level of distress
of these thoughts was more conducive to the presence of an accentuated B 
State by virtue of recurrent processing and/or a latent savings principle 
that could be effectively re-init iated via the habituation process.
• The method of presentation was modified in an attempt to make the thought
experiences more intense and consistent. Subjects were exposed to edited 
audiotaped presentations of themselves discussing highly salient features 
of their intrusive thoughts. Salkovskis (1983) argues that subjects
thinking tends to follow such taped material, evoking cognitive and 
affective processes that are experienced as a valid recreation of the
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intrusive thought. These changes allowed the retention of the one minute 
in te r - t r ia l  intervals following Soloman's (1980) suggestion that
increases in stimulus duration and intensity increase the c r i t ica l  decay 
duration allowing the accentuation of the opponent process.
• Subjects were screened for the use of cognitive r ituals in response to 
intrusive thoughts. Those making up the experimental group were
instructed in means of avoiding such strategies but to subsequently 
report use where i t  did occur.
In summary, the study sought primarily to test for the presence of a positive 
affective opponent process in subjects who took part in an habituation 
training procedure for negative intrusive thoughts. In establishing this, the 
relevant theory predicts that the following wil l  be observed; (A) in i t ia l  mood 
induction, (B) habituation of the primary process, and (C) affective contrast.
Specifically, i t  is hypothesised that:
1) Subjects engaging a negative intrusive thought wi l l  exhibit a signif icant 
shi f t  in mood in a negative direction away from baseline measures.
2) The in i t ia l  mood sh i f t  wi l l  decrease with repeated presentations of the 
stimuli and be s ignif icantly less than the in i t ia l  measure, in the 
direction of the baseline, when subsequently measured. This would 
constitute affective habituation.
3) At some point after the post-stimulus rest period there wi l l  be a sh i f t
in mood that s ignif icantly deviates from baseline measures in the 
opposite direction of the in i t ia l  mood swing. That is, an affective
contrast wil l  be observed.
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2 METHOD
2 .1  SUBJECTS
A total of 118 undergraduate psychology students from the Australian National 
University completed an in i t ia l  questionnaire on intrusive thoughts. This 
represented a 79% return rate on the 150 copies distributed. Subjects were
regarded as suitable for the experimental procedure i f  they experienced their 
nominated thought at least f ive times during the previous two weeks. Thirty 
subjects experienced a thought at this frequency, of which twelve agreed to
participate in the experiment. One subject decided not to take part when 
contacted while another subject reported a change of circumstance which
resulted in a marked decline in the frequency of his thought and was therefore 
considered unsuitable.
Ten subjects completed the experimental task. The sample comprised 7 females 
and 3 males. Subjects ages ranged from 19 to 53 years. Most subjects
received course credit for completing the questionnaire but not for the 
experimental procedure i t s e l f .
2 .2  APPARATUS
2 . 2 . 1  INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE
The Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire (Appendix 1) was a br ief  form examining 
descriptive features of negative intrusive thoughts. I ts  format was largely 
derived from a questionnaire by Edwards (1984) and where possible, response 
options from that instrument were retained to allow direct comparisons of the 
data. The present questionnaire included eleven items examining quantitative 
features, such as the frequency and duration of such thoughts, as well as 
qualitative features such as form, content and triggering stimuli.
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The p r i n c i p a l  p u r p o s e  o f  the q u e s t i o n n a i r e  was to act as a s c r e e n i n g  d e v i c e 
a l l o w i n g  s u b j e c t  s e l e c t i o n  for the e x p e r i m e n t a l  p r o c e d u r e  that f o l l o w e d . 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in that t a sk was ba se d on f r e q u e n c y  i n i t i a l l y  r e p o r t e d ,  with the 
m i n i m u m  r e q u i r e m e n t  be i n g  that s u b j e c t s  e x p e r i e n c e d  their n o m i n a t e d  t h o u g h t  on 
no less than 5 (i.e. 5 - 14) o c c a s i o n s  o v e r  the p r e v i o u s  two weeks. 
I n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  the q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a l s o  a s s i s t e d  in the se t t i n g  o f  
e x p e r i m e n t a l  p a r a m e t e r s  for i n t r u s i v e  t h o u g h t s  and p r o v i d e d  initial 
i n f o r m a t i o n  on n e u t r a l i s i n g  r e s p o n s e s .
2.2.2 INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS DIARY
S u b j e c t s  w h o  c o m p l e t e d  the p r e - e x p e r i m e n t  i n t e r v i e w  were as ke d to c o m p l e t e  an 
I n t r u s i v e  T h o u g h t s  D i a r y  for 5 c o n s e c u t i v e  days pr i o r  to t a k i n g  p a rt in the 
e x p e r i m e n t  (see A p p e n d i x  2). The p r i m a r y  p u r p o s e  o f  the d i a r y  was to p r o v i d e  
an a d d i t i o n a l  in v i v o  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  s u b j e c t s  use o f  c o g n i t i v e  n e u t r a l i s i n g  
r e s p o n s e s  wh i c h  are k n o w n  to have a high f r e q u e n c y  in the n o n - c l i n i c a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  ( S a l k o v s k i s  and Dent, 1989). D u r i n g  the i n t e r v i e w s  it was
d e t e r m i n e d  that none o f  the s u b j e c t s  e n g a g e d  in b e h a v i o u r a l  r i t u a l s  in 
r e s p o n s e  to i n t r u s i v e  t h o u ght s. C o g n i t i v e  n e u t r a l i s i n g  was d e f i n e d  as 
t h o u g h t s  used to stop or r e d u c e  u n p l e a s a n t  f e e l i n g  a s s o c i a t e d  with the 
i n t r u s i v e  c o g n i t i o n .  R a t i n g s  o f  u n p l e a s a n t  a f f e c t  w e re taken b e f o r e  and a f t e r 
the n e u t r a l i s i n g  t h o u g h t  to d e t e r m i n e  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  to p e r f o r m  this 
f u n c t i o n .  S u b j e c t s  w e re r e g a r d e d  as e n g a g i n g  in n e u t r a l i s i n g  r e s p o n s e s ,  o f  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  f r e q u e n c y  to i n t e r f e r e  with p r i m a r y  and o p p o n e n t  a f f e c t i v e  
r e a c t i o n s ,  if t h ey p e r f o r m e d  such r i t u a l s  on m o r e  than 507« o f  the o c c a s i o n s  
noted. It was a d d i t i o n a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  that s u b j e c t s  sh ou ld e x p e r i e n c e  a 
r e d u c t i o n  in d i s c o m f o r t  f o l l o w i n g  the r e s p o n s e  on at least 507, o f  th es e 
o c c a s i o n s  for this c o n s i d e r a t i o n  to be made. S u b j e c t s  were t h e r e a f t e r  d e e m e d  
' n e u t r a l i s e r s '  or ' n o n - n e u t r a l i s e r s '  a c c o r d i n g  to these two c r i t e r i a  and co u l d 
be b r i e f e d  for n o n - u s e  pr i o r  to the p r o c e d u r e  (see A p p e n d i x  2).
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The diary also sought to determine frequency, duration and triggering stimuli 
in relation to intrusive thoughts. The frequency count was used to assess the 
reliability of questionnaire estimates. Duration estimates were used to 
assess reasonable trial periods for the experimental task. Information on 
triggering stimuli helped direct the individual editing of taped interview 
material to effectively evoke the intrusive thought.
2.2.3 MOOD ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
2.2.3.1 THE PROFILE OF MOOD STATES (POMS)
Subjects completed the POMS questionnaire, a measure of general mood, for the 
two week period preceding the experiment (Appendix 3 0 .  Excessive chronic 
mood states such as depression and anxiety have been found to increase the 
frequency and persistence of intrusive thoughts (Sutherland, Newman and 
Rachman, 1 982 ; Edwards and Dickerson, 1987b). The POMS was used as a means of 
controlling for excessive mood states such as these. The depression and 
tension (anxiety) scales were the only ones to be scored.
The POMS has been demonstrated to be a reliable and valid measure of mood 
(McNaire, Lorr and Droppleman, 1971) and to show a high degree of structural 
similarity between American and Australian student samples (Robbins, 1981). 
The 'one week' verison of the POMS was modified to 'two weeks' to include the 
period of diary keeping since the frequencies reported during this period were 
similar to those of the period preceding the Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire.
2.2.3.2 VISUAL ANALOGUE MOOD SCALES
Ten visual analogue scales were used to assess subjects current subjective 
mood states (Appendix 3D). A number of studies have reported the successful 
use of these scales to measure transient mood shifts in non-clinical
-  28 -
populations (Will iams, 1980: Teasdale and Taylor, 1981; Teadsale and Russell , 
1983). The scales presently used consisted of 100mm l ines label led at e i ther 
end by opposing statements such as ' I  am NOT fee l ing at a l l  anxious1 to ' I  am 
fee l ing extremely anxious'. Subjects indicated how they f e l t  'RIGHT NOW' by 
placing a cross at an appropriate point along the l ine.
Each of the ten scales was based on a mood adject ive in common usage, with 
f ive  representing posi t ive mood and f ive  representing negative mood. The 
scores of the f ive  posi t ive adject ive scales (pleased, relaxed, l ighthearted, 
excited and happy) were summed to produce a postive mood scale ('Posmood'). 
The f ive  negative adjective scales (anxious, i r r i t a t e d ,  f rus t ra ted ,  
discouraged and disappointed) were summed to produce a negative mood scale 
('Negmood'). In each case the scale represented a score between 0 and 500. 
The choice of the adject ives was based on Ward (1988) while the formation of  
the posi t ive and negative mood scales was based on studies by Walsh (1986) who 
found them to be s ign i f ican t  measures of  mood induction in Austral ian students.
2 . 2 . 3 . 3 . THE STROOP TASK
Subjects completed emotion-based var ia t ions of the Stroop Colour-Naming Task 
(1938) as a secondary measure of mood. In i t s  usual form subjects are 
required to name the ink colour in which words are wri t ten and ignore the word 
content. Colour-naming is known to be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  slowed i f  the words 
themselves are colour names that c o n f l i c t  with the colour of the ink in which 
they are wr i t ten.  Subsequent studies have shown that interference phenomena 
occur whenever cognit ive representations corresponding to the meaning of  the 
word are simultaneously activated (Warren, 1972).
Emotional states have also been shown to contr ibute to Stroop interference as 
a function of a f fec t  concomitant with, or induced by, the task. Pal lak,
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Pittman, Heller and Munson (1975) observed an increase in errors when items 
were presented at a fixed rate to subjects threatened with electric shock. 
Experiments by Clore (cited in Bower, 1981) showed that the induction of mood 
states slowed colour-naming for all emotional words, whether positive or 
negative. Watts, McKenna, Sharrock and Trezise (1986) observed that spider 
phobics are selectively showed in the colour-naming of spider-related words, 
while Mathews and McLeod (1985) observed evidence of interference in 
fear-specific domains such that subjects reporting fear of physical threats 
were selectively slowed in the naming of the physical threat words.
In interpreting their results Mathews and McLeod (1985) suggested that words 
representing a specific threat are selectively attended to in competition for 
processing resources against the original task, producing the interference. 
Harvey (1984) has pointed to an alternative, affect-induced processing bias 
suggesting that sub-processing of salient word content produces an emotional 
response which reduces subsequent attentional resources. Mathews and McLeod
(1985) have suggested that both processes may be operating to produce
interference or may selectively produce interference effects in different 
populations. For example, the most pronounced affects have been observed in 
clinical subjects with an apparent bias in threat evaluation (Williams and
McNulty, 1986) although significant differences in processing rates have been 
observed in normal subjects in response to transient mood induction procedures 
(e.g. Pollack et a l . 1975; Clore, 1981). I t  appears that the lat ter
interference is predominantly affect-mediated while the former represents a 
stimulus-specific processing bias. Whilst employing threat-specific 
materials, i t  was expected that any interference effect in the present study 
would be predominantly affect-based and responsive to transient mood shifts.
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The Stroop Task appears capable of providing an objective performance measure 
of transient shifts in affect. Since emotion is a diffucult construct to 
measure (Coleman, 1975) a secondary device to the Visual Analogue Scales could 
potentially improve the rel iabi l i ty of these measures. Alternative
psychomotor measures such as speech rate, writing speed and facial movement 
were rejected due to a lack of evidence supporting their use as a measure of 
transient mood states (Ward, 1988; Walsh, 1984; Davidson, 1984). 
Physiological measures such as heart rate and skin conductance were similarly 
rejected because of interpretive difficult ies in relation to an opponent 
process and as measures of emotion generally (Lang, 1979), as well as reported 
low levels of rel iabi l i ty  of such measures (Arena, Blanchard, Andrasik, Cotch 
and Myers, 1983).
Examples of two verions of the Stroop Task used in the current experiment are 
presented in Appendices 3E and 3F. Words selected for the task represented
either physical or social threat, based on evidence that category specificity 
selectively increases response latencies (Mathews and McLeod, 1985). Three 
subjects completed the 'physical-threat'  Stroop and seven completed the 
'social-threat '  version based on the theme of their nominated thought. Twelve 
threat words from each category were used (Mathews et. a l ., 1 985) and
supplemented by a further four words from Watts et. a l . (1 984) and placed in
the appropriate category (e.g. 'crash' ,  'shame'). This yielded a pool of 16
words all matched for frequency, length and syllable number. To minimise 
practice affects the f i r s t  and second presentation consisted of eight
different words in each category and a combination of f i r s t  and second l i s t  
words in the final presentation. The eight words were repeated ten times 
yielding a l i s t  of eighty threat words and an equivalent number of control 
words in each of the three presentations. The words were written in colour 
pens on A4 paper, in block capitals 0.5cm high and in one of four colours 
(red, orange, green and blue) with each word balanced across colours.
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Due to the odd number of t r i a l s  and the prospect of an incomplete ro ta t ion  of 
threat and control words across presentations, the control words were always 
presented f i r s t  and the threat words second. Practice af fects  have been noted 
with the Stroop (Jensen and Rohwer, 1 966) and i t  may therefore be argued that 
the la te r  presentation of the threat words would work against the hypothesised 
interference (slowing) e f fec t .  S ign i f icant  differences despite th is  would 
indicate a robust interference in threat speci f ic  processing.
On the basis of the cognit ive processing models outl ined above, i t  was 
predicted that at baseline, in the absence of  mood induction, there would be 
no interference and therefore no s ign i f ica n t  differences in response latencies 
between neutral and threat-re levant word l i s t s .  With the negative mood swing 
hypothesised at the time of the second presentation i t  is expected that threat 
words would evince s ig n i f ic a n t ly  longer latencies than neutral words. A 
s imi lar  resu l t  is expected at the th i rd  presentation but based on the 
hypothesised swing into posit ive e f fec t .  This fol lows Clore's (1981) 
observation that strong posit ive emotion increased naming times fo r  both 
posi t ive and negatively valenced materials. Since the interference e f fec t  is 
non-specif ic,  corroborative subjective evidence from the Analogue Scales w i l l  
be needed to determine the valence of  the mood state producing the ef fec t  
during the second and th i rd  presentations.
2 . 2 . 4  PRE-TEST QUESTIONS
Prior to commencing the experimental task subjects were asked to answer 
questions about the i r  nominated in trus ive thought (see Appendix 3B). This was 
an addit ional screening device to ensure that the content, frequency and 
valence of the presenting thought was consistent with that previously 
nominated in the questionnaire and discussed in the pre-experiment interview. 
The questions were presented to the subject by the experimenter and included a
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description of the thought, i ts frequency in the previous week and a check of 
i ts valence via mood adjectives from the Visual Analogue Scale. The 
experiment proceeded when i t  was ascertained that content and frequency were 
consistent with previous descriptions, and mood induction categories indicated 
current negative valence.
Prior to the screening subjects had also been categorised according to their 
tendencies to engage in cognitive r i tua ls.  These followed the cr i te r ia  
derived from the results of the intrusive thoughts diaries. Following the
screening, subjects were given information about the form and function of 
these behaviours and asked to avoid their use. Continued use of these 
strategies despite instruction was subsequently determined in the Post-Test 
Questions.
2 . 2 . 5  RELAXATION
Subjects participated in a f ive minute relaxation exercise prior to the 
commencement of the experimental task. This was a modified version of Wolpe 
and Lazarus' (1966) progressive muscular relaxation procedure and involved 
tension and relaxation of major muscle groups. Subjects followed audiotaped 
instructions to complete the procedure.
Parkinson and Rachman (1980) found that habituation to intrusive thoughts is 
fac i l i ta ted by prior relaxation. They also observed that relaxation reduced 
discomfort associated with intrusive thoughts and that this occured 
independently of the reductions associated with the habituation process 
i t s e l f ,  effectively fac i l i ta t ing  exposure to the thoughts. To the extent that 
relaxation could enhance habituation and contribute to an opponent process, i t  
was regarded as important to reduce in i t ia l  levels of tension prior to the 
task.
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2 . 2.6 POST-TEST QUESTIONS
Upon completion of the experimental task subjects were asked to rate features 
of  the procedure to determine the v a l i d i t y  of the thought experience i t  had 
produced (Appendix 3H). The questions considered the perceived naturalness of 
the thought and 'mind-wandering' from the task. The la t te r  category 
considered time spent thinking of other things during the ' thought periods' 
and also the extent to which the in trus ive thought was engaged during the 
i n t e r - t r i a l  period.
The perceived 'naturalness' of the thought was regarded as a crucial  var iable 
since i t  provided a measure of the v a l i d i t y  of  the thought experience. Where 
subjects fa i led  to have an in trus ive thought they regarded as reasonably 
natural,  a primary a f fec t ive  response (a process) is un l ike ly  to have emerged, 
leading to a fa i lu re  of the opponent process. On th is  basis there appeared 
grounds to exclude the data of subjects report ing that the i r  thoughts appeared 
'not very much' l ike  the na tura l ly  occuring event.
Mind-wandering was considered a less serious fa i lu re  of  the paradigm since 
f luctuations in both cognit ive and a f fec t ive  engagement of in t rus ive  thoughts 
are a recognised feature o f  these phenomena (Edwards and Dickerson, 1987a). 
Fluctuations in mood induction may e f fec t  the timing of the proposed B State 
but not i t s  occurrence, assuming primary mood induction is achieved. Should 
the latency of the B State be delayed i t  is argued that the s e n s i t i v i t y  and 
overal l  duration of  mood assessment in te rvals  would ensure they are detected 
nonetheless.
2 .3  PROCEDURE
Following completion of the In trus ive Thoughts Questionnaire subjects meeting 
frequency c r i t e r i a  and w i l l in g  to par t ic ipa te  were asked to attend a
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pre-experiment interview. The purpose of this was to gather audiotaped 
material relating to the subjects intrusive thought and edit this for use in 
the experimental procedure. A series of standard questions were used to
e l i c i t  information about the form, content, tr iggering material or situations, 
emotional quality and personal meaning of the thought. Sessions were 
generally less than 30 minutes, typically yeilding 10-20 minutes of taped 
material. While the sessions may have contributed to the habitutation process 
they were nonetheless kept br ief,  so as to interfere with the natural
progression of the thought as l i t t l e  as possible. Subjects were given the 
Intrusive Thoughts Diary at the end of the session and asked to begin the
following day and return mail them on completion. The subjects were contacted 
again upon diary completion and given an appointment time for the experiment. 
All subjects completed the experimental task within four weeks of receiving
the in i t ia l  questionnaire.
The experiment was conducted in a small room without windows, devoid of 
extraneous materials and with l ight suff ic ient for reading. Subjects sat in 
an armchair with tape equipment, the experimental booklet and reading 
materials placed on a table to their r ight. A tape deck with connecting 
headphones was used to present the experimental procedure. A separate 
portable tape unit with in -bu i l t  microphone was used to record recitations of 
the Stroop colour-naming task. Following a reiterat ion of the intructions by 
the experimenter to correct any misunderstandings, the subject was le f t  alone 
to complete the taped procedure. The experimenter occupied an adjoining room 
and kept independent timing of the procedure, returning with further materials 
after the completion of the tape.
The experimental procedure is presented in Appendix 3. All materials 
presented to subjects during this task are reproduced in Appendices 3A - 3H. 
Subjects were given three different test 'booklets' during the course of the
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experiment. The f i r s t  booklet contained a set of general instructions
(Appendix 3A) giving a rationale for the experiment and further definitions of
negative intrusive thoughts. This was followed by the Pre-Test screening 
questionnaire, the POMS and the in i t ia l  Visual Analogue Scale and Stroop Task 
which provided the baseline for these two measures. The f i r s t  booklet
concluded with specific instructions for the experimental procedure (Appendix
3G). Subjects were also given instructions at this point to refrain from
using cognitive neutralising strategies during the procedure.
The experiment proper consisted of a taped habituation training procedure
presented over headphones. Following relaxation instructions subjects 
experienced six presentations of edited taped material consisting of their 
descriptions of salient features of their thought. The f i r s t  three of these 
'thought periods' were four minutes long with the last three being three 
minutes in length. The thought periods were interspersed with one minute 
periods of silence during which subjects were to avoid thinking about their 
nominated thought, examining emotionally neutral reading material i f
necessary. The beginning and the end of each thought period was marked by a 
tone. All other instructions, such as the timing of the analogue mood scales, 
were presented over the tape.
Subjects completed a second booklet of materials during the experimental phase 
which contained four analogue scales and two Stroop tasks. A break between 
the third and fourth thought periods allowed completion of the second analogue 
and Stroop tasks respectively. The three remaining analogue scales in this 
phase were completed at 2.5 minute intervals one minute after the completion 
of the sixth and f inal thought period ( i .e .  at 30, 32.5 and 35 min.). The 
tape finished at the 38 minute mark following instructions for the f inal 
Stroop task.
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A seven minute rest period followed the final Stroop task. The experimenter 
entered the room at this point and presented the final booklet. These
contained the last two analogue scales, completed at 48 and 50.5 min. 
respectively, and the Post-Test validity ratings. The experimenter allowed 
8 minutes for the completion of this material before entering the room.
Debriefing included an expansion of the previous experimental rationale to 
include consideration of an opponent-process and a check of any ongoing 
negative emotion. This was worked through where appropriate. All subjects
reported a level of emotion at least equivalent to pre-experimental levels
upon departure, with most reporting an improved state.
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3 RESULTS
3.1 INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE
The Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire was used pr imar i ly  as a screening device 
and as such the resul ts  (presented in Appendix 4) w i l l  only be given cursory 
a t te n t io n .
Of the 118 subjects who completed the questionnaire, 106 (95%) suggested that 
they had experienced a negative in trus ive thought, while 81 (67%) stated that 
they had had at least one such thought in the previous two weeks. Such an 
incidence is consistent with previously reported rates of occurrence (e.g. 
Edwards, 1984; Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984).
The content of the thoughts ty p ic a l ly  involved thoughts of violence or harm to 
se l f  or others, with 65% of subjects and 50% of  the experimental group 
report ing th is  as the theme of the i r  primary thought. This compares with 
Edwards (1984) f ind ing of  44% fo r  a s imilar  'harm' cagegory, although th is  
tended to be less inc lusive than the current category which included thoughts 
of i l lness  or disease. I t  is worth noting that many of the thoughts in th is  
major category involve subjects concern regarding the i r  capacity fo r  
d i r e c t / in d i re c t  harm to others. These results tend to support Salkovskis' 
(1985) view that the et io logy and maintenance of in t rus ive cognitions revolves 
around subjects perceptions of respons ib i l i ty  fo r  harm and i t s  prevention.
Negative in t rus ive thoughts tended to take the form of an image (30%) or a 
thought (33%). This d i f fe rs  from Edwards (1984) f indings fo r  images (12%) and 
tends to support de Si l va' s (1986) contention that more extreme ruminatory 
phenomena, the present basis fo r select ion, may involve images at a greater 
frequency.
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Most subjects experienced the i r  primary thought fo r  less than 10 minutes when 
i t  occurred (897»), with 43% experiencing them fo r  less than one minute. Nine 
of  the ten subjects noted a typical  duration of less than 10 minutes, 
suggesting that the task duration of 3-4 minutes was a val id durat ion. Those 
in the experimental group also reported a lowered capacity to control the 
duration of the i r  thoughts with 907» report ing that they had control only ' t o  
some extent'  or less, compared with 607, of  the main group.
The 81 subjects experiencing in t rus ive thoughts gave a combined to ta l  o f  188 
responses regarding cognit ive or behavioural actions subsequent to th e i r  
thoughts. Only 217, of these responses were not consistent with attempts to 
neutral ise the thought or anxiety associated with i t  ( i . e .  'don ' t  do 
anything1, ' th ink  i t  through').  A fu r the r  127, of responses related to forms 
of  behavioural r i t u a l i s in g  ('absorbing a c t i v i t y ' ,  'act ion or r i t u a l ' )  whi le 
627, (116 responses) involved cognitive strategies to remove the thought or 
associated a f fec t  ( ' reassure myself ' ,  ' th ink  of something e lse ' ,  'say s top ' ) .  
These la t te r  responses were given by 68 subjects, ind icating that 847, of those 
experiencing negative in trus ive thoughts reported the use of  one or more 
strategies involving cognit ive neutra l is ing responses. This included 757, of 
the experimental group. Such f indings are consistent with those of Salkovskis 
and Dent (1 989) who observed that 777, of a non-c l in ica l  group u t i l i s e d  such 
strategies in response to negative in t rus ive thoughts. Such a high incidence 
has obvious implicat ions fo r  the maintenance of these thoughts in c l in i c a l  and 
non-c l inica l sett ings.
3 .2  PRE-TEST QUESTIONS
None of the 10 experimental subjects were excluded from the procedure on the 
basis of the pre-test questions. Al l subjects described content consistent 
with the thought previously nominated and nine used negative adjectives
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e x c l u s i v e l y  to r e p r e s e n t  its v a l e n c e .  On e  s u b j e c t  a d d i t i o n a l l y  used p o s i t i v e  
a d j e c t i v e s  but it had been p r e v i o u s l y  r e c o g n i s e d  that this p e r c e p t i o n  
c o n t r i b u t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to the a n x i e t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th the t h o u g h t .
S e v e n  o f  the s u b j e c t s  r e p o r t e d  a f r e q u e n c y  in the p r e c e d i n g  w e e k  w h i c h  was 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th q u e s t i o n n a i r e  and d i a r y  r a t i n g s .  O n e s u b j e c t  r e p o r t e d  a 
s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  w h i l e  two o t h e r s  r e p o r t e d  a d e c r e a s e  o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  5 0 %  f r o m  
the initial m e a s u r e s  but still r e g a r d e d  t h e m  as h a v i n g  t h e i r  p r e v i o u s  
e m o t i o n a l  impact.
3.3 PROFILE OF MOOD STATES (POMS)
G r o u p  me an s and s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s  w e re c a l c u l a t e d  for the T e n s i o n - A n x i e t y  
( x = 16.4, s=7.6) and the D e p r e s s i o n - D e j e c t i o n  ( x = 18.5, s = 3 1.2) s c a l e s  f o r  the 
POMS. Two t - t e s t  c o m p a r i s o n s  w e re then m a d e  a g a i n s t  n o r m a t i v e  d a t a  for 
A m e r i c a n  c o l l e g e  s t u d e n t s  (T-A, x= 13 .4, s=7.1: D-D, x = 13.95, s = 10.00). T h e s e 
i n d i c a t e d  that the p r e s e n t  s u b j e c t  g r o u p  did not d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  the 
n o r m a t i v e  s a mp le for e i t h e r  a n x i e t y  (t = 1.11, p < 0 . 0 5 )  or d e p r e s s i o n  (t =1 . 0 8 , 
p < 0 .05).
W h i l e  individ ua l s u b j e c t s  did p r o d u c e  m o o d  s c or es o u t s i d e  the r a n g e  for 
s t u d e n t  norms, th es e were in all ca se s b e l o w  n o r m a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  for c l in ica l 
o u t p a t i e n t s  ( M c N a i r  et. a l . 1971). It is l i k e l y  that the m o r e  s t r i n g e n t  
c r i t e r i a  of c o n s i d e r i n g  m o o d  o v e r  the p r e v i o u s  f o r t n i g h t  g e n e r a l l y  i n f l a t e d  
sc ores r e l a t i v e  to the s t u d e n t  norms. On this ba si s it a p p e a r e d  t h at none of 
the s u b j e c t s  w e re c u r r e n t l y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a n x i e t y  or d e p r e s s i o n  w h i c h  was of 
cl inical s i g n i f i c a n c e  and w h i c h  m a y  have p r o v i d e d  an e x p e r i m e n t a l  c o n f o u n d .
3.4 POST-TEST QUESTIONS
It was s u g g e s t e d  that in the a b s e n c e  of a r e a s o n a b l y  natural i n t r u s i v e  t h o u g h t
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during the procedure subjects were unlikely to experience strong primary 
affect or a subsequent opponent process. Two subjects failed to meet the 
minimum criteria set for this i .e.  that their thoughts were like the naturally 
occurring event at least ' to some extent' .  On this basis they were excluded 
from subsequent data analysis.
Mind-wandering was considered less serious since its likely effect would be on 
the timing of an opponent process, not its occurrence. Two subjects reported 
that they 'sometimes' thought of other things during the thought periods while 
the six remaining subjects reported that this happpened 'never' or 'not very 
often' .  One subject reported thinking of her nominated thought 'most of the 
time' during the inter- tr ial  intervals, four subjects noted that this occurred 
only 'sometimes', whilst the remainder reported no such occurrence.
Only one of the eight subjects reported the use of cognitive neutralising 
activi t ies.  This involved an active attempt to think of another specific 
thought during consideration of particular aspects of her intrusive thought. 
This subject had described previous neutralising thoughts in both her 
questionnaire and diary responses and had been placed in the neutralising 
group.
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3 . 5  V IS U A L  ANALOGUE SCALES
The analogue mood rat ings of eight subjects were included in the f ina l  
analysis. Table 1 outl ines the means, standard deviat ions, and confidence 
in terva ls  fo r  the combined posit ive ('Posmood') and negative ('Negmood') mood 
scales completed by the subjects over the seven presentations. Given the 
avai lable data set, i t  is argued that the most appropriate analysis of  the 
hypotheses under consideration would be made using a series of paired t - t e s t  
comparisons (1). The data are reproduced graphical ly  in Figure 4.1.
POSMOOD
Presentation 1(0) 2(14) 3(30) 4(32.5) 5(35) 6(48) 7(50.5)
X 246 118 96 143 147 229 250
S.D. 90 60 64 95 81 134 135
C.I. ±75 ±50 ±54 ±80 ±68 ±113 ±113
Comparison 1:2 2:3 3:4 3:5
t* 4.06“  1.06 2.47“  1.47
NEGMOOD
Presentation 1(0) 2(14) 3(30) 4(32.5) 5(35) 6(48) 7(50.5)
X 145 276 309 287 257 148 163
S.D. 83 112 95 81 134 138 112
C.I. ±70 ±94 ±80 ±68 ±113 ±116 ±94
Comparison 1:2 2:3 3:4 3:5
t* 2.67“  0.94 1.27 1.27
‘ where t ( d f , x )
=2.36
“ s ign i f ica n t  resu l t
Table 1: Means, standard deviat ions, confidence intervals and paired t - t e s t
comparisons fo r  the posit ive and negative analogue mood scales
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A necessary pre-condition fo r  the occurrence of a posit ive opponent process 
was the establishment of primary negative mood induction. This would be 
observed as a s ign i f ican t  swing towards negative a f fec t ,  away from baseline 
measures, fol lowing the three i n i t i a l  presentations of the in t rus ive  thought 
material.  A comparison of  Posmood rat ings at Time 1 (basel ine) and Time 2 
(14 mins.) indicated a s ign i f ica n t  reduction in posit ive a f fec t  over th is  
period ( t  = 4.06, p<0.05). This was supported by a s ig n i f ica n t  increase in 
mean Negmood rat ings over the same interval ( t=2.67, p<0.05). These resul ts  
supported the f i r s t  hypothesis; that the presentation of the interv iew 
material would e l i c i t  sa l ient aspects of the in trus ive thought resu l t ing  in 
s ign i f ica n t  negative mood induction.
(1) The decision to use selected t - t e s t  comparisons fol lowed consul tat ion 
with the Faculties S ta t is t i c a l  Consultant. Their use allowed d i re c t
comparisons of the mean pairs relevant to the three main hypotheses under 
consideration. They have been used se lec t ive ly  because of the known hazards 
of mult ip le test ing such as changes in the notional p robab i l i ty  leve l ,  and 
l im i ta t ions  such as a lack of orthogonal independence. An analysis of
variance was un l ike ly  to be appropriate since i t s  use in the present case 
would v io la te  the assumption of compound symmetry. Beyond th is ,  the scope of 
the present data do not j u s t i f y  the use of formal mu lt iva r ia te  analysis. 
Whilst a MANOVA incorporating the Hotel ings-t procedure was th e o re t ica l ly  
appropriate, the size of the present data set would also have vio lated 
assumptions inherent in i t s  use.
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— Positive mood Negative mood
00 IO
Time (minutes)
Figure 4.1 Mean positive and negative mood ratings for the Visual
Analogue Scales.
Following mood induction with the in i t ia l  stimuli i t  was predicted that 
subjects would show affective habituation to the intrusive thoughts. This
process would be observed as a signif icant decline in negative affect with the 
offset of the stimulus at Time 3 (30 min.) relative to Time 2 (14 min.). A 
comparison of mood ratings between these intervals indicated that such a trend 
had not occurred. For both Posmood and Negmood, comparative measures between 
Time 2 and Time 3 indicated a continuation of the earl ier trend towards 
negative affect, although this was not s ta t is t ica l ly  signif icant (Posmood: 
t = 1.06, p<0.05) (Negmood; t = 0.94, p<0.05). These results indicated that, 
contrary to the hypothesis, affective habituation to the intrusive thoughts 
had not occurred following in i t ia l  mood induction.
-  44  -
I t  was fu r ther  hypothesised that with the o f fse t  of the s t im u l i ,  an a f fec t ive  
opponent process would be observed. This would be manifest as a s ig n i f ic a n t  
s h i f t  in a f fec t ,  in a posi t ive d i rec t ion ,  at Time 4 (32.5 min.) and/or Time 5 
(35 min.) re la t ive  to Time 3 and baseline measures. As can be seen in Fig 4.1 
none of the mean mood rat ings at Times 4 or 5, for  e i ther the pos i t ive or
negative mood scales, approached the i r  respective baselines. For the Negmood
scale the comparison of Time 3 and Time 4 was not s ign i f ica n t  ( t  = 1.27,
P<0.05). The comparison between Time 3 and Time 5 was also not s ig n i f ic a n t  
( t  = 1.27, p<0.05). For the Posmood scale there was a s ign i f ica n t  increase in 
pos i t ive a f fec t  between Time 3 and Time 4 ( t  = 2.47, p<0.05) wh i ls t  the 
comparison between Time 3 and Time 5 was not s ign i f ica n t  ( t  = 1.42, p<0.05). 
Thus, the resul ts indicated that,  contrary to the hypothesis, no s ig n i f ic a n t  
a f fec t ive  contrast emerged fol lowing the o f fse t  of the in t rus ive  thought 
s t im u l i .
The resul ts for  the visual analogue scales indicated a general ly increasing 
level of negative a f fec t  over the course of presentations, as measured by 
increases in Negmood and decreases in the Posmood scale. This fol lowed a 
gradual return to baseline measures fo r  both scales with the o f fse t  o f  the 
s t im u l i .  This resu l t ,  which represented a highly uniform trend fo r  both 
posi t ive and negative mood measures, is consistent with the occurrence of 
negative mood induction and a subsequent return to pre-experimental levels .
Whilst a s ign i f ica n t  increase in posit ive a f fec t  was observed on the pos i t ive  
mood scale fo l lowing the o f fse t  of the s t im u l i ,  th is  occurred re la t ive  to the 
Time 3 (30 min) measurement and not the baseline measure fo r  pos i t ive mood, 
set as the c r i t e r i a  fo r  an opponent process. As such, th is  pa r t icu la r  f ind ing  
appears to represent an accelerated return to baseline re la t ive  to other 
post-stimulus measures but indicates a s imi lar trend nonetheless.
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3 . 5 . 1  INDIVIDUAL RESULTS
Individual resul ts  fo r  the Visual Analogue Scales were largely consistent with 
the trend observed fo r  the group resul ts .  Whilst negative mood induction was 
consis tent ly  observed, there was no evidence of comprehensive habituation or 
a f fec t ive  opponent processes. Table 3 outl ines the results fo r  the f i r s t  f i ve  
presentations fo r  each of the eight subjects.
SUBJECT TIME (min.) BASELINE (0) 14 30 32.5 25
1 P0SM00D (+) 56 10 10 11 11
NEGMOOD (- ) 238 291 333 337 341
2 + 326 129 222 317 126
- 62 372 318 267 381
3 + 210 224 127 232 202
- 155 84 338 257 271
4 + 316 109 46 139 243
- 145 360 369 264 51
5 + 317 80 89 100 74
- 117 414 485 464 464
6 + 202 118 83 164 199
- 151 189 169 202 168
7 + 291 126 67 91 220
- 276 311 250 283 237
8 + 255 149 128 94 104
- 22 192 222 225 156
TABLE 2: Individual resu lts fo r  the Visual Analogue Scale over the f i r s t
f ive  presentations
As with the group resu l ts ,  mood induction would be observed as a decrease in 
posi t ive a f fec t  and an increase in negative a f fec t  at Time 2 (14 min.) 
re la t ive  to Time 1 (basel ine). With the exception of subject 3, a l l  subjects 
reported a s h i f t  towards negative a f fec t  consistent with th is  trend. Subject
3 i n i t i a l l y  reported a s l ig h t  increase in posit ive af fect  and a decrease in
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negative affect at Time 2 (14 min.) but subsequently reported a large decrease 
in positive affect and an increase in negative affect relative to Time 3 (30 
min.). Thus i t  appeared that negative mood induction did occur in this case 
but was the result of later rather than earl ier presentations.
The fa i lure of an habituation process to emerge in the group results was
similar ly evident at the individual level. Subjects 5, 6 and 7 observed mild 
trends consistent with an habituation process on either the positive or
negative scale. Subject 2 reported both a decrease on the negative scale and 
an increase on the positive scale at Time 3 (30 min.) relative to Time 2 (14 
min.). Whilst the former results are more equivocal, subject 2 provided the 
only results fu l l y  consistent with an habituation process, within a body of 
results otherwise indicating the absence of such a process. Despite the
apparent occurrence of affective habituation in this subject no subsequent 
evidence of an opponent process was observed in relation to this individual.
An affective opponent process would be observed as an increase in positive
affect and a decrease in negative affect at Time 4 (32.5 min.) relative to 
individual baseline measures. Subjects 3, 4 and 7 showed minor trends
consistent with an opponent process but in all cases these occurred on either 
the positive or negative scales only, were of small proportions and were not 
maintained across intervals. As such they were to l ikely  represent minor 
fluctuations away from individual trends which were otherwise in accordance 
with the group results.
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3 .6  THE STROOP TASK
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for 
the reaction time data of the eight subjects completing the Stroop Task. 
These data represent a collapsing of the physical and social threat categories 
following observation that the results for the two subjects in the physical 
category observed a similar trend to those in the social threat group. Paired 
t-tests were calculated comparing mean reaction times for the neutral and 
threat-related l is ts  at each of the three presentations. These are also 
presented in Table 2. Figure 4.2 shows the mean reaction times and confidence 
intervals for the neutral and threat related l is ts  over the three 
presentations.
NEUTRAL WORDS
Presentation N1 N2 N3
X 71 .71 61 .23 64.62
S.D. 20.88 11.52 15.45
C.I. ±17.11 ±9.69 ±13.00
THREAT WORDS
Presentation T1 T2 T3
X 78.81 71 .91 72.59
S.D. 23.84 13.48 18.03
C.I. ±20.09 ±11.36 ±15.19
*where t ( d f ,T )
=2.36
**signif icant result
Table 3: Means, standard deviations, confidence intervals and paired t- test
comparisons for the neutral and threat versions of the Stroop 
Colour-Naming Task
Comparison N1:T1 N2:T2 N3:T3
t 3.0** 7.41** 2.23
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On the basis of  the cognit ive processing model previously discussed i t  was 
predicted that at basel ine, in the absence of mood induction, there would be 
no interference and therefore no s ign i f ican t  dif ference in mean response 
latencies between normal and threat-re la ted mood l i s t s .  A comparison of these 
two conditions at the f i r s t  presentation indicted that,  contrary to the 
hypothesis, response latencies for the threat l i s t  were s ig n i f ic a n t ly  slower 
that fo r  the neutral l i s t  (t=3.00, p<0.05). This indicated that an
affect-based interference in the cognit ive processing of th is  material had 
occurred.
80 -
Threat
70 -
Neutral
60 -
50 -
(Omin) (16 min) (33 min)
Presentation
Figure 4.2 Mean naming latencies for threat-re lated and neutral Stroop word 
l is ts
-  49 -
With the negative mood swing hypothesised at the time of the second
presentation, i t  was predicted that threat words would evince significantly 
longer naming latencies than neutral words. A comparison of the two 
conditions at the second presentation supported this prediction. The mean
naming time for the threat condition was significantly slower than that for 
the neutral condition (t=7.41, p<0.5). This was a highly robust finding and 
represented the greatest discrepancy in response latencies between these 
conditions over the three presentations. As such i t  supported the prediction
that the induction of strong negative affect associated with intrusive
thoughts would selectively retard the naming latencies of threat-related words.
At the third presentation, with the hypothesised swing into positive affect ,  
i t  was again predicted that threat words would evince longer naming latencies 
than neutral words. The effect in this instance was assumed to be the result  
of processing interference resulting from strong positive affect rather than 
negative affect. However, since the mean analogue mood ratings taken at the 
32.5 minute interval indicated that a negative affective state persisted at 
this point, a significant effect would reflect this,  rather than the positive 
affect predicted. In fact the difference between response latencies at the
third presentation failed to reach significance (t=2.23, p<0.05).
The results of the Stroop colour-naming task appear to be broadly consistent 
with those of the Visual Analogue Scales, supporting their use as a secondary, 
objective measure of mood status. Despite known practice affects for the 
Stroop task, (Jensen and Rohwer, 1966), which would tend to reduce the naming 
latencies of the lat ter presentations, the threat-related l i s t  produced longer 
latencies on each occasion in spite of their secondary ordering. A simple 
ordering effects explanation for the retarded processing of threat material 
also seems untenable given the necessity of working against any practice 
effects and the considerable variation in response-time comparisons observed 
across presentations.
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As expected a s ig n i f ic a n t  slowing of threat-re la ted words was observed at the 
second presentation concomitant with the subjective report ing strong negative 
a f fec t .  This supported the hypothesis of a select ive affect-based 
interference in the cognit ive processing of th reat-re la ted mater ial.  This 
resu l t  must be interpreted with caution however, in the absence of the 
non-s ign i f icant  baseline e f fec t  which had been predicted. This hypothesis was 
based on the assumption that at baseline (presentat ion 1), p r io r  to the 
experimental task, subjects would experience a neutral a f fec t ive  state 
producing no interference. The resu l t  may have been accounted fo r  by negative 
a f fec t  based on subjects an t ic ipa t ion  of an unpleasant task. However, 
analogue measures at th is  point suggested neutral to posit ive a f fec t .  This 
resu l t  may re f le c t  a more enduring bias in the cognitive processing of threat 
material which may operate in the absence o f ,  or concomitant with, a 
speci f ic  affect-based inter ference. Both of  these accounts have been 
considered previously (e.g. Clore, 1981; Mathews and McLeod, 1985) although i t  
had been postulated that the present subjects were l i k e l y  to respond on the 
basis of  transient mood sh i f ts  rather than an enduring processing bias. I t  
remains possible that both were a feature of  the present resu l ts .
In summary, the resul ts  of the second and th i rd  Stroop presentations appear 
consistent with the affect-based interference o r ig in a l l y  postulated. As such 
they support the subjective f ind ings that an a f fec t ive  opponent process did 
not occur. However the fa i lu re  to establ ish a f fec t ive  n e u t ra l i t y  at baseline 
measures fo r  th is  task, and a possible a l te rna t ive  account fo r  these f ind ings,  
makes the former resul ts  more equivocal. I t  is perhaps worth noting that had 
more s tr ingent p robab i l i ty  levels been adopted, the baseline resu l t  would have 
fa i le d  to reach sign if icance while those fo r  the second presentation would 
have remained robust. This would have been more consistent with the 
interference account o r ig in a l l y  postulated.
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4 . DISCUSSION
The results of the present study did not support the central hypothesis; that 
a positive affective state would emerge following negative mood induction 
relating to intrusive thoughts. The f i r s t  hypothesis, that intrusive thoughts 
would induce a significant shi f t  toward negative mood, was supported. There 
was no evidence indicating affective habituation to the thoughts following 
primary mood induction. Thus the results are consistent with affective 
changes that would be expected during a mood induction procedure and are in 
accord with the earl ier findings of Ward (1988). A significant sh i f t  towards 
negative mood was experienced consistent with the engagement of negative 
intrusive thoughts. This was followed by a return to baseline with the 
termination of the stimulus.
The failure of an opponent process to emerge gives rise to the question of 
whether the methodology employed in the study provided an adequate test of the 
theory. A functional defini t ion of 'adequacy' in this sense requires an 
examination of the theoretical pre-condition necessary for the emergence of an 
affective opponent process. According to Soloman (1980) primary mood 
induction is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the creation of an 
opponent process. Habituation is not a necessary pre-condition. To the 
extent that the present methodology produced signif icant negative mood 
induction, i t  successfully established the affective state necessary for the 
creation of an opponent process. In fact, comparisons with the results of 
Ward (1988) indicate mood induction of a greater magnitude than that observed 
in the earl ier procedure. Methodological refinements including the use of a 
taped procedure, controll ing the use of cognitive neutralising strategies and 
the selection of a higher frequency subject group appear to have been 
successful in creating a more intense primary affective state. Despite this a 
subsequent opponent process was not evident. Explanations for this may be 
considered at both a methodological and theoretical level.
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It may be argued that the requirement of listening to audiotaped material as a 
prompt to the engaging of the thought was an ar t i f ic ial  procedure which was 
unlikely to produce a valid recreation of the thought. However the experience 
of participating subjects and wider empirical evidence indicates that this is 
not the case. Eight of the ten subjects reported that their thought 
experiences were similar to their naturally occurring cognitions. Similarly 
Kirk (1983) and Salkovskis (1985) have reported significant reductions in the 
frequency of clinical and non-clinical ruminations using this procedure. To 
the extent that exposure to the thought is posited to be the effective 
therapeutic component (Kirk, 1983) i t  would appear that this procedure is 
capable of inducing valid intrusive thought experiences.
Whilst habituation is not considered necessary for the establishment of an 
opponent process, its presence is indicative of an accentuation of the b 
process. The failure of habituation to emerge questions the application of 
the training procedure presently employed. It  is possible that both the 
number of t r ials  and their timing were insufficient to produce this effect.  
While Parkinson and Rachman (1980) also had six t r ia l s ,  their inclusion of pre 
and post measurements increased this number to eight. The number in the 
present procedure was reduced to six to match the time intervals of the
Ranieri and Zeiss (1984) mood induction procedure. Parkinson and Rachman
(1980) have also indicated that the total duration of stimulus exposure is an 
important determinant of the habituation process. While the present procedure 
employed fewer t r ia l s  the total duration of exposure was greater than that of 
Parkinson and Rachman. To this extent i t  would appear that t r ial  durations 
were theoretically sufficient to produce habituation effects.
In addition to the actual trial  number the necessity of including mood 
measures prior to the third inter- tr ial  interval may also have reduced the 
'effective'  number of habituation t r ia ls .  According to opponent process
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theory the increase in the in te r  t r i a l  phase may have been s u f f ic ie n t  to 
extinguish any emerging b process, thereby ha lt ing habituation. Parkinson and 
Rachman's (1980) suggestion that the habituation process often occurs 
subsequent to an increase in disturbance points to the necessity of a 
s u f f ic ie n t  number of t r i a l s  which are consistent ly maintained. I t  was 
postulated that increases in stimulus qua l i ty  and duration would allow an 
e f fec t ive  increase in the c r i t i c a l  decay duration (e.g. Starr ,  1978). 
However, the f ind ings of a non-s igni f icant increase in negative mood rat ings 
from the th i rd  to the s ix th t r i a l  may indicate the decay of the b process at 
th is  point,  reducing any subsequent habituation.
A fu r the r  p o s s ib i l i t y  is that the mood measures employed in the study were not 
sensit ive enough to detect the emergence of a B state. In the absence of  
habituation, the b process would have fa i led  to accentuate and therefore would 
have remained re la t i v e l y  small. However the se l f  report measures did re f le c t  
the i n i t i a l  mood changes from baseline as well as subtle sh i f ts  observed on 
the posi t ive scale fo l lowing the sixth thought period. As noted previously, 
small changes in the magnitude of self -reported mood, as occured in the 
l a t t e r ,  may otherwise have been interpreted as an opponent process had they 
occured re la t ive  to basel ine. This l a t te r  resu l t  represented an accelerated 
return to pre-experimental a f fec t ive  levels which was anomalous to the overal l  
t rend.
The evidence above suggests that the Analogue scales were s u f f i c ie n t l y  
sensit ive to reg is te r  even a small opponent process had i t  occurred. This 
necessari ly assumes that the process is occurring during the measurement 
interval and overlooks the p o s s ib i l i t y  of a complete opponent phase during the 
2.5 minute inter-assessment in te rva ls .  Such an event is un l ike ly  given the 
uniform return to baseline with the termination of the stimulus but does 
h igh l igh t  the l im i ta t io ns  of discrete measurement in te rvals  within th is
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paradigm. Future research adopting a continuous assessment would overcome
th is re s t r i c t io n  and be po ten t ia l ly  less in t rus ive within th is  process.
Given the primary measurement function of subjective ra t ing scales i t  is 
necessary to address the p o s s ib i l i t y  that the current resul ts  r e f le c t  
experimental demand character is t ics .  This is especial ly important given that 
the resu lts appear consistent with such an outcome, while an a f fec t ive  
opponent process would be coun te r - in tu i t ive  and less subject to such a process.
Several factors mit igate against an explanation of the current results based 
on subject demand. F i r s t l y ,  i t  has been argued that the procedure is capable 
of e l i c i t i n g  in t rus ive thoughts that are a val id recreation of  the natural 
event and that the reported emotional sh i f ts  r e f le c t  real change. Secondly, 
the results  of the Stroop task are general ly consistent with those observed 
for  the Analogue scales. As object ive measures these are presumably not 
subject to experimental demand. Th ird ly , i f  the results r e f le c t  th is  process, 
then the question remains as to why the return to baseline should have been so 
protracted when the in tu i t i v e  response may have been a rapid return to 
pre-experimental levels with the o f fse t  of the s t im u l i .  F ina l ly ,  a number of 
mood induction studies have observed that demand character is t ics  are not the 
sole cause of subjects sel f- reported mood changes (e.g. Velten 1968; Pol ivy 
and Doyle, 1980; Renieri and Zeiss, 1984).
In summary, the experimental design appears to have been adequate to test fo r  
the opponent process hypothesised in response to primary a f fec t ive  changes 
associated with the negative in trus ive thoughts. Several methodological 
refinements appear to have produced an enhanced primary response compared to 
that observed by Ward (1988). Despite the l imi ted sample size s ign i f ica n t  
mood changes were observed during the course of the experiment. These were, 
however, consistent with the induction of negative mood only. Neither se l f
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report nor objective measures provided evidence to support the occurrence of 
affective habituation or an opponent process.
The results of the Stroop task were generally consistent with self reported 
mood changes, especially at the second interval where the greatest negative 
mood induction was predicted. However, their failure to establish affective 
neutrality at baseline and the possibility of an alternative processing 
strategy at this point, questions the value of this task as a secondary 
measure of mood. Finally, methodological features of the design which may 
have accounted for the null finding were considered.
The major results of the present study are in accord with those of Ward (1988) 
who observed primary mood induction but the absence of habitiation or opponent 
process. This occurred despite the apparent success of the current 
methodology in enhancing the primary affective state. Although methodological 
features have been considered in relation to this outcome, theoretical issues 
regarding the conceptualisation and subsequent measurement of emotion are also 
of relevance.
At a general level the ambiguous relationship between the subjective and 
performance measures used in this experiment reflect the broader difficul t ies 
encountered by researches attempting to measure emotion. Despite a general 
consensus that "emotion is more than subjective reports of feeling" (Lang, 
1984), comprehensive analyses employing behavioural, subjective and 
physiological measures typically show poor correlations (Arena et al ., 1 983).
This difficulty is further compounded when a specific analysis via opponent 
process theory is attempted. Soloman (1980) makes no specific attempt to 
define emotion but refers simply to 'hedonic processes'. Given the early 
emphasis on measures of physiological arousal in the creation of the theory,
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the questions arises as to whether i t  may e f fe c t iv e ly  be applied to a l l  
emotional states or to spec i f ic  quant i ta t ive measures of arousal. In 
examining negative mood as the dependent var iable, the current procedure 
fol lowed other studies of the opponent process in not addressing a formal 
d is t in c t io n  between a f fec t ive  and arousal states. Schacter and Singer (1962) 
have argued that physiological arousal is a necessary condit ion in the 
experience of an emotional state. More recent ly however, Arena et al . ( 1 983) 
have pointed to the complexity o f  th is  re la t ionship  and argued against a 
pre-eminant role fo r  arousal in emotional processes.
Despite conceptual issues re la t ing  to the subject of measurement, numerous 
studies of opponent process theory employing se l f  report measures have 
observed s ig n i f ica n t  emotional sh i f ts  which appear inconsistent with 
quant i ta t ive changes in arousal alone. Whilst capable of  producing 
physiological arousal (Rabavilas et a l . ,  1974) in t rus ive  thoughts have been 
p r imar i ly  conceptualised as cognit ive st imuli  which produce a f fec t ive  changes 
(Rachman, 1981). Given th is  observation, i t  was postulated that a f fec t ive  
changes induced by these thoughts are comparable to those observed in other 
appl icat ions of opponent process theory and should therefore be subject to the 
a f fec t ive  dynamics postulated. The fa i lu re  to observe such a process may 
indicate that th is  assumption is s im p l is t ic  and that in t rus ive thought 
phenomena consti tu te  a special case.
Unlike the present study, successful appl icat ions of  opponent process theory 
have usual ly occured in circumscribed s i tuations and t y p ic a l l y  involved 
discrete forms of  st imuli  (e.g P i l i v i n  et a t . ,  1982; Craig and Siegal, 1979). 
The implicat ions of  th is  are twofold. F i r s t l y ,  beyond operational de f in i t ion s  
of the thought 'engagement' cognitions as st imuli  are d i f f i c u l t  to con tro l .  
Whilst i t  was suggested that the present methodology could accomodate
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temporally variable affect, the factors previously noted which might reduce 
the b process would make this task more difficult .  Secondly, whilst not
necessarily appealing to a demand feature, successful applications of opponent 
process theory have typically involved situations providing a recognisable 
context for the experience of positive emotion. Conversely, intrusive
thoughts and the experimental situation may provide an environment where any 
positive post-reaction appeared contextually inappropriate and was therefore 
suppressed, both personally and via self-report. Attribution theorists have 
noted a tendency for individuals to interpret unexplained arousal negatively 
(eg. Maslach, 1979) and for environmental cues to mediate the perceived
valence of affective states generally (Brodt and Zimbardo, 1981). Given this 
possibility,  i t  is interesting to consider whether environmental cues in a 
naturalist ic setting may more readily faci l i tate the attribution of positive 
affect following negative intrusive thoughts.
The outcome of this study has several implications for the opponent process
theory i tsel f .  Like the earl ier work by Ward (1988), the present paradigm
failed to demonstrate an opponent process despite a strong primary affective 
response. Self report measures were used because of previous successful 
applications (e.g. Myers and Siegal, 1985) and theoretical extrapolations
regarding the subject of measurement i.e.  affective states. In its original 
form however, opponent process theory refers to a maintenance system based on 
arousal states (Soloman and Corbit, 1973; Soloman, 1980). It  remains possible 
that the effective component in opponent process states is primarily
physiological in nature and that changes in affect are not s t r ic t ly
concomitant with physiological changes. A distinction such as this may
account for the 'success' of some tests of the theory and the absence of an
effect in others, including the present result.
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Clear ly , the del ineation between a f fec t ive  and arousal states is complex and 
the former cannot be assumed on the basis of  the la t t e r  (Arena et a 1 ., 1 983). 
Further c la r i f i c a t io n  of the theory is needed i f  i t  is to a t ta in  broad 
relevance within human populations. In p a r t icu la r ,  th is  should involve a
determination of whether the theory appeals more s t r i c t l y  to a physiological 
homeostatic response or motivation via a f fec t ive  reinforcement contingencies. 
While Soloman (1980) has implied that both are operative, fu r the r  
c la r i f i c a t io n  of the theory has implicat ions fo r  both the measurement 
instruments applied to i t s  assessment and, po te n t ia l ly ,  the range of  human 
experience i t  may encompass.
F ina l ly ,  what implicat ions do the present results have for  a theory regarding 
the maintenance of obsessional thoughts. The theore tical associat ion between 
in trus ive thoughts and obsessions, the i r  mutual capacity to evoke negative 
a f fec t  and the successful demonstration of  a f fec t ive  opponent processes in 
related a c t i v i t i e s  has been considered. Given th is ,  i t  appeared feasib le to 
apply the theory to instrus ive thoughts and general ise supporting resul ts  to a 
maintenance theory of obsessions. In the absence of  an opponent process 
subsequent to negative in trus ive thoughts, the role of  a re in forc ing  
post-reaction has not been establ ished.
Clearly i t  cannot be stated that opponent process theory is untenable on the 
basis of the current nul l  f ind ing .  Successful appl icat ions of  the theory 
indicate that opponent processes are operative within these contexts. 
However, the current resu lts may indicate that i t s  speci f ic  appl icat ion to 
in t rus ive thoughts is untenable. Reasons fo r  th is  include problems inherent 
in the nature of the stimulus and the experimental se t t ing .  These are, 
arguably, methodological considerations which may be p o te n t ia l ly  overcome. 
More important however, is the need for  fu r the r  c la r i f y in g  theory regarding 
the object of measurement before such a d e f in i t i v e  test could be performed.
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At present,  these resul ts  and similar previous findings (Hard, 1988) do not 
support a maintenance theory of intrusive thoughts based on an affect ive  
opponent process. As such, they can be said to offer  l i t t l e  to compliment or 
challenge exist ing theories (e.g.  Rachman and Hodgeson, 1980; Salkovskis, 
1985). Despite this ,  the theory remains a useful heuri s t ic  which may 
potent ial ly link theoretical  accounts of addiction and obsessional phenomena 
and have important implications for both of these areas.
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Appendix 1
Return to:
Garry Stevens 
C/0 Psychology 
Office
CODE NUMBER:
INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is part of a Clinical Master's research project 
on the nature of intrusive thoughts. Intrusive thoughts are defined as 
thoughts which seem to be involuntary and which you have repeatedly. 
Intrusive thoughts vary in content from thoughts of pleasant topics, 
like romance and holidays, to thoughts of unpleasant topics, like 
violence and illness. The present project will only be examining 
unpleasant intrusive thoughts.
The questions that follow ask for information about various 
aspects of your intrusive thoughts. As a clinician I am aware of the 
importance of privacy and your responses will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality. Please answer questions as accurately and completely 
as you can. Try not to leave out any questions that apply to you. 
There are no right or wrong answers.
Thank you.
Age _____
Sex M\F
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2PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING:
The following questions are all concerned with unpleasant 
intrusive thoughts.
Intrusive thoughts enter your mind repeatedly, that is, they do 
not occur just once or twice, but come back a number of times on 
separate occasions. They are often unpleasant, unwanted and upsetting. 
Intrusive thoughts may take the form of an urge to do something, a 
picture or image in your mind, or may involve just thinking about 
something. Recent research has shown that most people at some time 
experience intrusive thoughts.
Examples of unpleasant intrusive thoughts may include:
- a repeated urge to jump out a window
- a repeated image of being attacked
- repeated thoughts of a 'disgusting' sexual act
- a repeated thought that something is wrong with your 
health
- thoughts of loved ones being harmed
Please complete the following questions on intrusive thoughts. If 
you do not want to do so however, please hand back the form, or you may 
keep it if you wish.
Q.l Have you ever experienced an unpleasant intrusive thought?
YES NO (circle one)
Q.2 How many different intrusive thoughts have you experienced in the 
past two weeks?
NONE 1 2 3 or more (circle one)
If you have experienced at least one unpleasant intrusive thought 
in the past two weeks please continue. If you have NOT, you have 
completed as much as you can and have now finished. Please return this 
sheet. Thank you for taking part.
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3Think about the most unpleasant and memorable intrusive thought 
you have experienced during the past two weeks and answer the following 
questions about that one.
Q.3 Describe briefly the content of this unpleasant thought in the
space below (If you do not wish to disclose its content, just list 
some key words that would help you to recognise it)
Q.4 Describe briefly the situation that you are usually in when you 
have this intrusive thought. For example, studying, falling 
asleep or talking to someone.
For each of the following questions, circle the number that best applies 
to the unpleasant intrusive thought that you just described.
Q.5 This intrusive thought takes the form of:
1. an image or picture in my mind
2. an urge to do something
3. a thought that is neither an image nor an urge.
4. a combination of the above.
Q.6 About how long does this intrusive thought usually last when it 
occurs?
1. Less than a minute
2. one to ten minutes
3. ten to thirty minutes
4 . more than thirty minutes
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4Q.7 When was the first time that you experienced this intrusive 
thought?
1. less than a week ago
2. about 1 to 2 weeks ago
3. about 2 weeks to a month ago
4. about 1 to 6 months ago
5. more than 6 months ago
Q.8 During the past two weeks about how many times has this intrusive 
thought occurred
1. once
2. 2 to 4 times
3. 5 to 14 times (up to once a day)
4. 15 to 56 (up to 4 times per day)
5. over 56 times (over 4 times per day)
Q.9 Please circle any of the following which seem to trigger off your 
intrusive thought. Circle as many as you wish.
1. the mood I'm in
2. another thought of my own
3. an act of my own
4. something done or said by someone else
5. some other event: (please specify)
6. I am not aware of any particular triggers.
Q.10 To what extent can you control the duration of this thought?
not very to some to a large 
not at all much extent extent completely
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5Q .11 Once the intrusive thought gets into your mind, what do you
usually do about it? Circle all the choices that apply, but don't 
include methods you hardly ever use.
1. I don't do anything, it goes of its own accord
2. I reassure myself that it doesn't mean anything
3. I think it through
4. I try to think of something else
5. I throw myself into some absorbing activity
6. I say 'stop' to myself
7. I perform an action or ritual (either in my mind or in
actuality) which makes the thought powerless
8. Other.
CODE NUMBER:
The second part of this study will involve an experiment examining 
the relationship between intrusive thoughts and mood. Only a small 
number of people will be asked to participate in this study. If you 
would be willing to be contacted over possible participation in the 
experimental phase please fill in the details below or see me 
immediately after you have finished filling out the questionnaire. All 
of this information will be removed from this page and destroyed once 
the subjects have been contacted.
NAME:____________
CONTACT PHONE NO: 
CONTACT ADDRESS:
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Appendix 2
Day Time Triggered By Duration
unpleasant 
Feeling (0-100)
Used a Thought 
or Action to 
Stop it (Y/N)
Unpleasant 
Feeling (0-100)
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Appendix 3G
INSTRUCTIONS
The main purpose of this exercise is to see what sort of emotions people 
experience when they have an intrusive thought and what sort of emotions 
they have after it is gone. Your task is to concentrate all of your 
attention on your nominated thought. In doing this you will be aided by 
a taped description of your thought, which you provided during the earlier 
session. You will also hear some general questions. The purpose of both the 
description and questions is to help you fully concentrate on your specific 
thought during several periods of the experiment. You may follow the 
description as a way of experiencing your thought or use it as a starting point 
for thinking about other aspects of your thought. In the same way the 
questions may be used as cues to help you think about features of your 
thought. In any case you should be trying to absorb yourself as much as pos­
sible in the thought and experience it as naturally and realistically as 
possible. This also means opening yourself up to the emotions which are 
associated with the thought or the situation it represents. Try not to resist 
the thought in any way. If you find yourself getting distracted, try to bring 
yourself back to the thought. You can do this by thinking about it in 
different ways (e.g. visualise a scence, concentrate on an emotion) or focus­
sing on different aspects of the thought.
You will be asked to think about your nominated thought, in the manner 
described above, a total of six times. Each of these 'thought periods' will be 
3 to 4 minutes in length and there will be a one minute rest phase between 
each period. During the rest interval, just sit quietly and try not to think 
of the thought nominated for the experiment. If you find yourself returning 
to this thought and cannot distract yourself, some reading material will be 
available for this purpose. You will be asked to complete mood ratings 
after the third thought period, the sixth thought period and at various time 
intervals after that. Instructions about when to do these tasks will be 
presented over the headphones.
IF FOR ANY REASON YOU FEEL YOU CANNOT CONTINUE PLEASE FEEL FREE TO STOP THE 
EXPERIMENT.
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Appendix 3H
FINAL QUESTIONS
Naturalness
Did the thought resemble the way it would feel if it had occurred 
naturally?
not at not very to some to a large
all much extent extent completely
Mind-wandering
How often were you thinking about other things when you were meant 
to be thinking of the nominated thought?
not very most of all of
Never often sometimes the time the time
How often were you thinking of the nominated thought when you were 
meant to be sitting quietly, thinking of other things (or reading)?
not very most of all of
never often sometimes the time the time
Neutralisers
During the thought periods' were you aware of any attempts to stop 
either the nominated thought or any emotions associated with it.
[Tick one] Yes [ ] No [ ]
If yes, circle any of the following you recall using
1. tried to think of something else
2. reassured myself it didn't mean anything/attempted to rationalise
3. said 'stop' to myself (or another word or phrase)
4. performed a mental ritual or action to stop the thought 
or moderate it in some way
5. provide some details for the above responses (1-4) or for any 
other actions you recall
APPENDIX 4
INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE - RESULTS
N = 118 (10)
M - 41 (3) [35]
F - 77 (7) [65]
18-19 28 (3) [24]
20-24 63 (4) [53]
25-29 13 (1) [11]
30-34 2 (1) [ 2]
35-39 6 (1) [ 5]
40-44 5 [ 4]
45-49 1 [ 1]
1. "Ever experience unpleasant intrusive thoughts?"
YES - 106 (10) [951
NO - 12 [ 5]
2. "Number of different intrusive thoughts in past two weeks?
None 25 (2) [24]
One 33 (3) [31]
Two 18 (1) [17]
Three 30
81
(6) [28]
i N = 81
( ) indicate no. from experimental group - included within larger group. 
[ ] percentage
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3. Content
A. Violence or harm to s e l f  or others.
1. Acc iden ta l / in ten t iona l  harm to loved one or f r iend 17 [21]
2. Harming f r iend  or loved one 4 (2) [ 5]
3. Acc iden ta l / in ten t iona l  harm to s e l f  by others 11 (1) [14]
4. Harming oneself 2 [ 2]
5. Suicide o f  se l f  and/or others 3 [ 4]
6. Physical/mental i l ln e ss 5 (2) [ 6]
7. Terminal i l l n e ss 3 [ 4]
8. Death/non-existence o f  s e l f  or others 8 [10]
Fa i1ing course or exams 8 (2) [10]
In f id e l i t y /b e t ra y e d  confidence 5 (2) [ 6]
i . Other 10 (1) [12]
Content unknown 5 [ 6]
S i tuat ion in which i t  usual ly occurs *
A. Fal1ing asleep 19 [16]
B. Studying 19 [16]
C. When alone 15 [12]
D. Talking to someone 11 [ 9]
E. Mental ly unoccupied/bored 9 [ 7]
F. Relaxing/Music/Television 9 [ 7]
G. Driving 6 [ 5]
H. Topic spec i f ic  cue (e.g. person, place) 6 [ 5]
I . Waking up 3 [ 2]
3. Working 3 [ 3]
K. Other 9 [ 7]
L. Unknown 3 [ 2]
* Percentage o f  to ta l number o f  responses (n =121)
not subjects
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5. Form
1. Image 24 (1) [30]
2. Impulse 8 (1) [10]
3. Thought 27 (3) [33]
4. Combi nat ion 22 (5) [27]
6. Durat ion
1 . Less than 1 minute 35 (5) [43]
2. 1 -  10 minutes 37 (4) [46]
3. 10 -  30 minutes 7 (1) [ 9]
4. More than 30 minutes 2 [ 2]
7. F i r s t  Occurred?
1 . Less than 1 week ago 6 [ 7]
2. 1 -  2 weeks ago 8 [10]
3. 2 - 4  weeks ago 9 (2) [11]
4. 1-6 months ago 18 (2) [22]
5. more than 6 months ago 40 (6) [49]
i . Frequency ( l a s t  2 weeks)
1 . Once 27 [33]
2. 2 -  4 24 [29]
5 - 1 4 21 (7) [26]
1 5 - 5 6 6 (3) [ 7]
57 + 3 [ 4]
). Tr iggers
1 . Mood 42 [42]
2. Another thought 30 [19]
3. An ac t ion 22 [14]
4. Something said/done by another 28 [18]
5. Other 18 [12]
6. Not aware of  t r i g g e r s 14 [ 9]
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10 . Control durat ion?
1. Not at a l 1 6 (1) [ 7]
2. Not very much 14 (1) [17]
3. To some extent 29 (7) [36]
4. A large extent 26 (1) [32]
Completely 6 [ 7]
11 . Responses to thought
1 . Don11 do anything 13 [ 7]
2. Reassure myself 30 [16]
3. Think i t  through 27 [14]
4. Think of something else 43 [23]
5. Absorbing a c t i v i t y 14 [ 7]
6. ' Stop1 43 [23]
7. Action or r i t u a l 9 [ 5]
8. Other 9 [ 5]
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Addendum
p. 1 'Kagen' should read 'Kagan'
P.2,10, 
11,13 'Rachman and Hodgeson' should read 'Rachman and 
Hodgson'
P.2,13 'Legg-England' should read 'Legg England'
P. 3 'Edwards et. al. (1987b)' should read 'Edwards and
Dickerson (1987b)'
P . 4 'Epstein (1967)' should read 'Epstein (1967, cited 
Soloman,1980)
P.10,12 'Parkinson and Rachman (1981)' should read 
'Parkinson and Rachman (1981a)'
P. 16 'Moregan' should read 'Moergan'
P. 17 'Badderly' should read 'Badderley'
P. 18 'Robins (1981)' should read 'Robins (1980)'
P. 50 Paragraph 2; "...at the third presentation failed 
to reach significance" should read 
"... at the third presentation showed a 
significant difference".
P . 55 Addit. 'Polivy, J., and Doyle, C. (1980).
Laboratory induction of mood states 
through the reading of self-referent 
mood statements: Affective changes or 
demand characteristics? Journal of 
Abnormal Psvcholocjv. 89.286-290
P.56,64 'Lang (1984) ' should read 'Lang (1979)'
P. 65 'Pallack' should read 'Pollack'
P. 67 Salkovskis,P.M. (1985) incorrect cite, should read 
Salkovskis,P.M. (1988) Intrusive thoughts and 
obsessional disorders. In Glasgow, D. and Eisenberg 
N. (Eds.). Current Issues in Clinical Psvcholocjv. 4. 
London, Gower.
P. 69 'Solyom, L. (1976)' should read 'Solyom, L. (1972)'
P . 70 'Walsh, F.J. (1986)' should read 'Walsh, 
F.J.(1984)'
